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JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ARBITRATION IN CHINA:
ASSESSING THE EXTENT OF THE LATEST PRO-
ARBITRATION MOVE BY THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S 
COURT IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
DR. WEIXIA GU
INTRODUCTION
In China, the final say over arbitral jurisdiction, such as ruling on 
the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement,1 belongs to the na-
tional court, which is deemed as one of the two limbs of supervisory 
powers of courts versus arbitration.2  However, the real exercise of judi-
cial supervision depends on how the court treats arbitration, which large-
ly influenced by the status quo of its judicial system.  This article at-
tempts to explore the answers to three key questions.  First, whether there 
is any shortage in the legislative approach of judicial review over arbitra-
tion agreements under the current China Arbitration Law (AL) and its 
ancillary rules after comparison with international arbitration norms.  
Second, to what extent recently has the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 
made efforts to live up to international standards for prevention of exces-
sive judicial intervention in arbitral jurisdiction? Third, whether these 
regulatory remedies are sufficient, particularly whether enforcement dif-
ficulties still exist despite the rigorous SPC pro-arbitration move in the 
past decade.
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1 For the purpose of this article, judicial supervision over the arbitral jurisdiction is confined to
that over the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement.
2 The court’s supervisory power over arbitration is exercised in two ways (1) to examine the effec-
tiveness of the arbitration agreement and (2) to review the arbitral award.
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I. PRIORITIZED JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER CHINA 
ARBITRATION LAW AND THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S
COURT’S INTERPRETATIONS
The “parallel reviewing power over the arbitration agreement be-
tween the arbitral body and national court” underlying Article 5 of the 
AL seems to conflict with the “prioritized judicial review.” “Prioritized 
judicial review” is subsequently prescribed under Articles 20 and 26 
which is where the legislative ambiguity arises.
A.  LEGISLATIVE AMBIGUITY AMONG THE PROVISIONS
Under the AL, judicial review over the arbitration agreement is 
addressed through the  provisions found in Articles 5, 20, and 26. Article 
5 mandates the conditions to invoke such review:
If the parties have concluded an arbitration agreement and one party 
initiates an action in a people’s court, the people’s court shall not ac-
cept the case and shall refer that to the arbitration commission, unless 
the arbitration agreement is null and void. The decision by the arbi-
tration commission is final.3
According to the legislative annotations, Article 5 has been formulated to 
respect the original intention of the parties to arbitrate.  Further, the pro-
vision intends to strike a balance between party autonomy and judicial 
intervention in that the people’s court will not intervene in the arbitration 
process unless the arbitration agreement is non-existent or invalid.4  Ar-
ticle 5, thus, appears to accord with modern arbitration norms.5
Article 20 addresses the procedure with respect to the exercise of 
judicial review.  It deals with the competing jurisdiction between a court 
and an arbitration commission, where the party challenges the validity of 
an arbitration agreement.  Pursuant to Article 20:
If a party challenges the validity of an arbitration agreement, it may 
request the arbitration commission to make a decision or apply to the 
people’s court for a ruling.  If one party requests the commission to 
                                                          
3 Arbitration Law of China (promulgated by Order N.31 of the President of the People’s Rep. of 
China, Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 5.
4 ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA 36-37 (The Legislative Affairs Comm’n of the Standing Comm. 
of the Nat’l People’s Cong. of the P.R.C. ed., 1997).
5 Id. at 37.
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make a decision and the other party applies to the court for a ruling, 
the court shall give a ruling.  A party’s challenge of the effect of the 
arbitration agreement shall be raised prior to the arbitral tribunal’s 
first hearing.6
This jurisdictional challenge provision has two meanings (1) if the par-
ties separately apply to the arbitration commission and the people’s court 
for a ruling on the effect of the arbitration agreement, the decision of the 
court will prevail, and (2) the request for judicial review (raising the ju-
risdictional challenge) should be made before the first hearing of the tri-
bunal.7  It follows from Article 20 that the judicial power to review the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements trumps the arbitration commis-
sion.  This, however, contradicts the underling ideology of Article 5 and 
may lead to the internal conflict about the understanding of the provi-
sions.8
Article 26 also addresses the condition and procedure prescribed 
under Articles 5 and 20.  It provides that:
If the parties have concluded an arbitration agreement and one party 
has initiated an action in a people’s court without declaring the exis-
tence of the arbitration agreement and, after the people’s court has 
accepted the case, the other party submits the arbitration agreement 
prior to the first hearing of the court, the people’s court shall dismiss 
the case unless the arbitration agreement is null and void.  If, prior to 
the first hearing, the other party has not raised an objection, it shall be 
deemed to have renounced the arbitration agreement and the people’s 
court shall continue to try the case.9
Subject to the time limit under Article 20, Article 26 provides that the 
failure to submit the jurisdictional challenge to the court within the statu-
tory period (before the first hearing) will be treated as a waiver of the ar-
bitration agreement.10  Yet, Article 26 fails to clarify the confusion be-
tween Articles 5 and 20 about whether judicial review over the effect of 
an arbitration agreement is superior to its arbitral counterpart.
The legislative ambiguity under the AL was addressed, in 1998, 
by the SPC Reply on the Confirmation of the Validity of Arbitral Agree-
ment (SPC Reply).11  Under Article 3 of the SPC Reply, if an arbitration 
                                                          
6 Arbitration Law, art. 20 (P.R.C.).
7 ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA, supra note 4, at 62-63.
8 JOHN SHIJIAN MO, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA 106 (2001).
9 Arbitration Law, art. 26 (P.R.C).
10 ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA, supra 4, at 66.
11 Reply on the Confirmation of the Validity of Arbitral Agreement (promulgated by the Sup. 
People’s Ct., Nov. 5, 1998) Fa Shi (1998) No. 27 [hereinafter SPC Reply 1998 No. 27]
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commission has accepted the jurisdictional challenge and has rendered a 
decision prior to the same motion being filed in the people’s court, the 
court must dismiss the application.  However, if the arbitration commis-
sion has not made its decision before the party raises a jurisdictional 
challenge to the court, the court shall accept the application of challenge, 
and notify the commission to terminate the arbitral proceeding.12  In
1998, the Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court applied this article of the 
SPC judicial interpretation in Re Xingda Co (Xiamen) Ltd.13
Under Article 4 of the SPC Reply the following can occur (1) if 
one party files a dispute for arbitration arising from a contract or other 
property issues while the other party challenges the validity of the arbi-
tration agreement before the people’s court, and (2) initiates the lawsuit 
in respect of the same dispute, then, (3) once the case has been accepted 
by the people’s court, the court must instruct the arbitration commission 
to terminate the arbitral proceeding.  Article 4 further provides that after 
the court decides the arbitration agreement it shall send a copy of its rul-
ing to the arbitration commission, which must then decide either to 
resume the proceeding or withdraw the case according to the court’s in-
structions.14  In 1999, these rules were applied by Chongqing Higher 
People’s Court in Hongji Real Estate Development Company Ltd v. 
Communication Bank (Chongqing).15
The case relates to a contract for the sale of a commercial resi-
dence concluded in December 1998. The contract contained an arbitra-
tion clause to the “arbitration institution of Chongqing Municipality.”  
Since the Hongji Company did not wish to pursue arbitration as a means 
for resolving disputes, in 1999, it applied to the Chongqing Higher 
People’s Court for a ruling that the arbitration clause was invalid and 
asked the court to try the case instead.  The court notified the Chongqing 
                                                          
12 Id. art. 3.
13 In the Re Xingda Company case, there was a contract for the sale of steel between a Xiamen 
Company (A) and a Hong Kong Company (B).  The contract of sale had two versions: a printed 
English version providing for arbitration in CIETAC and a handwritten Chinese version provid-
ing for arbitration in the US.  In 1998, A submitted the dispute to CIETAC, but B challenged 
CIETAC’s jurisdiction to the Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court on the ground of the hand-
written arbitration clause.  The Xiamen Court, while the CIETAC proceedings were still ongoing 
to reach the determination on the effect of the arbitration clause, accepted the case and notified 
CIETAC to stop the proceeding pursuant to Article III of the SPC Reply.  See MO, supra note 8, 
at 83, ¶3.06.
14 SPC Reply 1998 No. 27, art. 4.
15 Hongji Real Estate Dev. Co. Ltd. v. Bank of Commc’ns (Chongqing Branch), (Chongqing High-
er People’s Ct., 1997), available at http://www.bjac.org.cn/news/view.asp?id=124&cataid=9 
(last visited May 19, 2009).
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Arbitration Commission to suspend the arbitral proceeding.  In ruling on 
the validity, the court held that the arbitration clause was reasonably 
clear as the Chongqing Arbitration Commission was established in ac-
cordance with the AL.  The court dismissed the application and the arbi-
tration commission resumed the arbitral proceeding.
There are several points worth noting about Article 3 of the SPC 
Reply.  To begin with, under Chinese jurisprudence, judicial interpreta-
tions must be qualified by the primary law to be interpreted.16 Pursuant 
to Article 20 of the AL, jurisdictional challenge to arbitration must be 
raised prior to the first hearing of the arbitral tribunal.  Therefore, the 
SPC rules apply only when a party brings the jurisdictional challenge be-
fore the first hearing of the arbitral tribunal.  In addition, within the time-
line, the judiciary may intervene whenever the arbitration commission’s 
decision on the effect of the arbitration agreement is pending, and the ar-
bitral proceeding must be stopped once the court accepts the case. In ac-
cordance with Article 3(2) of the SPC Reply, the arbitral tribunal can on-
ly resume the proceeding if the court instructs it to do so.  As such, the 
rules may provide the chance for the opposing party to use dilatory tac-
tics to request judicial review.  Such judicially-oriented review proce-
dures defeat the efficiency of arbitration.  Moreover, the SPC rules con-
firm the primacy of judicial power in determining the arbitral jurisdiction
versus the arbitration commission.17
While there is a trend to minimize judicial intervention in arbi-
tration proceeding in the international arbitration community, the com-
parative research discussed below shows that the gap between the Chi-
nese regulatory approach and international norms is still large.
B.  GAPS WITHIN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NORMS
This section will discuss the two major defects of judicial review 
over arbitral jurisdiction in China in comparison with international arbi-
                                                          
16 According to the PRC Legislation Law and People’s Court Organization Law, the SPC judicial 
interpretation cannot violate the provisions of the basic law it interprets.  See Law on Legislation 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 
2000), art. 8 (P.R.C.); Organic Law of the People’s Courts (revised 2006) (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective July 1, 1979), arts. 4 & 33 
(P.R.C.).
17 Some authors comment such “priority” as one aspect of Chinese distinctive “court-decisive” 
theory in arbitration.  See XIUWEN ZHAO, STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND ITS APPLICABLE LAW [GUOJI SHANGSHI ZHONGCAI JIQI SHIYONG FALV
YANJIU] 43 (2002).
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tration norms (1) the prioritized judicial review in procedure, and (2) the 
wider scope of judicial scrutiny in reviewing defective arbitration agree-
ments.
1. PROCEDURE OF REVIEW
While international arbitration norms recognize national courts 
as the final power to determine arbitral jurisdiction, the grant of a stay in 
cases of jurisdictional challenge will never stop the arbitral proceeding 
from moving forward.  Instead, there are parallel proceedings before the 
arbitral tribunal and court.
The United Nations Commission of International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(ML) is largely modeled off of Article 21 of the Arbitration Rules of the 
UNCITRAL, which deals with jurisdiction pleas in the arbitral tribunal.18  
Under the ML, judicial review of the arbitration agreement can be exer-
cised in three different stages: before, during, or after the arbitral pro-
ceeding.  Pursuant to the ML:
(1) The court may decide, before the tribunal has been formed, 
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.  Arbitral proceedings 
may nevertheless be commenced or continued and an award may be 
made while the issue is pending before the court.19
(2) During the arbitral proceeding, if the tribunal decides as a pre-
liminary ruling of the validity of the arbitration agreement,20 within 
thirty days upon the receipt of the ruling of the tribunal, any party 
may request the court to decide the matter as to which decision is not 
subject to appeal.21
(3) If the tribunal decides to rule on the validity of an arbitration 
agreement in the arbitral award which is usually the circumstance 
                                                          
18 Article 21(3)-(4) of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that, in general, the arbitral tribunal should 
rule on the plea as a preliminary question.  However, the tribunal may also proceed with the arbi-
tration and rule on the plea in its final award, which will only happen when it considers that the 
plea is obviously unfounded.  U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Model Law Arbitration Rules, 
art. 21(3)-(4), G.A. Assembly Resolution 31/98 (Apr. 28, 1976).
19 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/40/17/annex I, A/61/17//annex I (Jul. 7, 2006) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL Model Law].
20 According to Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the arbitral tribunal has discretion to 
choose whether to decide a jurisdiction problem in the manner of preliminary question or in an 
award of merits. Id. art. 16(3).
21 Id.
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when it is convinced it has jurisdiction,22 then, the court’s review 
must wait until after the arbitral proceeding ends and be exercised 
during the proceeding of recourse against the award.23
When dealing with a jurisdictional challenge, the ML acknowledges that 
the tribunal’s ruling on arbitral jurisdiction is subject to a final ruling of 
the court.24 However, after the tribunal has been formed and the arbitral 
proceeding has been commenced, a party intending to make a jurisdic-
tional challenge must first exhaust available arbitral procedures in accor-
dance with Article 16(3) of the ML.  For example, recently, in Netsys 
Technology Group AB v. Open Text Corp., the Ontario Supreme Court 
granted a stay and held that it would not be appropriate for the court, at 
this stage in the arbitral proceeding, to rule before the tribunal has spo-
ken on the effect of the arbitration agreements.  Thus, the court deferred 
to the arbitrator to be the first to interpret the arbitration clause.25
Moreover, the ML requires that any challenge to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction should not affect the arbitral hearing of the case.  The pur-
pose of such “concurrent or parallel proceedings”26 is to avoid the dilato-
ry tactics and disruption to the proceedings by unfounded challenges to 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal.27  In fact, the tribunal is allowed to con-
tinue with the arbitral hearing and even render an award while the juris-
dictional challenge is pending before the court.  As such, two proceed-
ings are allowed at the same time, one before the national court 
concerning jurisdictional matters and the other before the arbitral tribunal 
on the merits of the case.
                                                          
22 Id.
23 Id. art. 34(2)(a)(ii).
24 Id. art. 16(3).
25 Netsys Tech. Group AB v. Open Text Corp., [1999] O.J. 3134, §34 (Jul. 29, 1999), available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/1999/1999canlii14937/1999canlii14937.html.
26 See PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION IN 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS ¶2-047 (2nd ed. 2005), where Professor Binder sug-
gests that the ML allows two proceedings at the same time, one before the national court con-
cerning the jurisdiction issue and the other before the arbitral tribunal on the merits of the case.
27 See Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, art. 8, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (Mar. 25, 1985) (“to reduce the risk and effects of dilato-
ry tactics of a party reneging on his commitment to arbitration”).  For example, the tribunal can 
“assess in each case whether the risk of dilatory tactics is greater than the danger of wasting 
money and time in a useless arbitration,” and decide accordingly a jurisdiction question prelimi-
narily or in the final award.  For example, the tribunal can “assess in each case whether the risk 
of dilatory tactics is greater than the danger of wasting money and time in a useless arbitration,” 
and decide accordingly a jurisdiction question preliminarily or in the final award.  See HOWARD 
HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEUHAS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 486 (1989).
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The United Kingdom takes a similar “concurrent/parallel” ap-
proach regarding the procedure of judicial review over arbitration 
agreements.  First, British courts will only rule on the enforceability if it 
is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or 
incapable of being performed.28  Second, while different standards apply 
to the judicial review of different types of arbitral awards (domestic and 
international),29 the regime for reviewing arbitral jurisdiction in relation 
to the condition and procedure are applicable to both domestic and inter-
national arbitration.30  Third and most importantly, by virtue of Article 
67(2) of the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act (UKAA), the arbitral 
tribunal may continue the arbitral proceeding and make an award while
an application to the court challenging arbitral jurisdiction is pending.31  
Then, the tribunal can move to render the jurisdictional determination in 
the form of either a preliminary ruling or a final award.
Based on the authoritative commentary on the 1996 Arbitration 
Act,32 the purpose of Article 67(2) is to avoid unnecessary delay in arbi-
tral proceedings, and to “let the arbitrators who used to be timid about 
proceeding in such circumstances have clear authority to do so.”33  In 
People’s Insurance Company of China, Hebei Branch v. Vysanthi Ship-
ping Co Ltd (The “Joanna V”), the British Court of Appeal struck down 
a motion by the respondent who attempted to halt the arbitral proceeding 
by challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.34
Chinese regulations have addressed the issue of judicial supervi-
sion over arbitration agreements by dividing the jurisdictional power be-
tween the court and arbitration commission.  The overwhelming impres-
sion of the AL and SPC Reply is that procedurally, the court has been 
equipped with greater authority in reviewing the arbitration agreement.  
Therefore, rather than the “concurrent or parallel proceedings” approach 
under the ML and UKAA, where judicial “intervention” should follow 
                                                          
28 Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, art. 9(4) (U.K.) [hereinafter UKAA].
29 Parties can appeal on a question of law of domestic arbitral awards, while this is not available to 
international awards.  See UKAA, art. 69.  This is similarly worded under Section 23 of the 
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance. See generally Arbitration Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 341, § 23. 
(H.K.).
30 UKAA, art. 86(1) & (2).
31 UKAA, art. 67(2).
32 BRUCE HARRIS, ROWAN PLANTEROSE & JONATHAN TECKS, THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996: A
COMMENTARY (4th ed. 2007).
33 Id. at 309.
34 People’s Ins. Co. of China, Hebei Branch v. Vysanthi Shipping Co., [2003] EWHC 1655 
(Comm). (U.K.).
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the tribunal’s ruling on arbitral jurisdiction,35 the people’s courts in China 
are authorized to exercise jurisdictional power even before the arbitral 
tribunal.36 This peculiar procedural mechanism allows judges in China to 
intervene in the arbitral proceedings too early.  In practice, this may im-
properly subject arbitration to the courts.  Some Chinese commentators 
argue that the procedural priority of the people’s court in reviewing arbi-
tration agreements allows for excessive judicial intervention or even a 
negation of the doctrine of competence-competence.37  In addition, unless 
the tribunal has accepted the case and has made a ruling on the effect of 
the arbitration agreement before the court’s action, all arbitral proceed-
ings will be stayed until the court has announced its decision.38  There-
fore, the objecting party may take advantage of the procedural loophole 
and delay the dispute resolution process.
However more controversial is Article 58 of the AL which stipu-
lates that the people’s courts can revoke or refuse to enforce an arbitra-
tion award on the basis of a “non-existent” arbitration agreement.39  Pur-
suant to Article 20 of the AL, Chinese judicial review with respect to 
arbitral jurisdiction may only be exercised before the commencement of 
arbitral proceedings.40  It is, therefore, contentious whether “invalidity” 
could be considered a grounds for invoking judicial review in the award 
enforcement stage or whether the judicial supervisory power regarding 
arbitration agreements can be extended to the post-award stage.  The AL 
failed to address the issue and the subsequent SPC Reply did not clarify 
this point.
                                                          
35 The tribunal’s jurisdictional power derives from the doctrine of competence-competence.
36 A number of Chinese arbitration scholars have named the practice youxian guanxiaquan in Chi-
nese.  See, e.g., XIAOHONG LIU, JURISPRUDENCE AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA [GUOJI SHANGSHI ZHONGCAI XIEYI DE FAIL YU SHIZHENG] 
114-15 (2006).
37 The doctrine of competence-competence means that arbitral tribunals have the power to deter-
mine their own arbitral jurisdiction and jurisdictional challenge. For comments by Chinese scho-
lars in regards to the negation of the doctrine due to prioritized judicial review, see SHISONG XIE 
ET AL., STUDIES ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION [SHANGSHI ZHONGCAI FAXUE] 209-10 (2003).
38 SPC Reply 1998 No. 27, supra note 11, art. 3.
39 Arbitration Law, art. 58 (1) (P.R.C.); Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 3, 1982, effective Oct. 10, 1982), art. 260 (1) (P.R.C.).  Article 58 of 
the Arbitration Law and Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Law both provide grounds for refusal 
of the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, among which, the first ground refers to 
“the non-existence of an arbitration agreement.”  Id.  Neither of the two provisions involves the 
“invalidity of the arbitration agreement” as one of the grounds to exercise judicial supervision.
40 See Arbitration Law, art. 20 (P.R.C.).
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2. SCOPE OF REVIEW
Prevailing international norms provide a broader scope than the 
AL in saving defective arbitration agreements by national courts.  As 
such, in practice, courts have openly shown their tendency to respect the 
parties’ intention to arbitrate except in cases of extreme vagueness of ar-
bitral agreements.41
Pursuant to Article 8(1) of the ML, the court is bound to honor 
the arbitration agreement, “unless the agreement is null and void, inoper-
ative or incapable of being performed.”42  Under Article 8(1), modeled on 
Article II(3) of the New York Convention (NYC), the court of a contract-
ing state, when challenged by one party with respect to the effect of the 
arbitration agreement, with respect to the effect of the arbitration agree-
ment between the parties, shall at the request of one of the parties, refer 
the parties to arbitration, “unless it finds the said agreement is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”43  Article 9(4) of the 
UKAA has adopted similar wordings to the ML and NYC with respect to 
a mandatory stay by the British courts, even if there is only a slim chance 
for “operativeness or effectiveness” of arbitration agreements.44  This is 
natural since most of the jurisdictional challenges that come before the 
court relate to ambiguous arbitration agreements resulting from defective 
draftsmanship—defectiveness often borders on the verge of enforceabili-
ty and unenforceability.45  Thus, it is important to what extent the nation-
al courts accommodate these drafting defects and consequent patholo-
gies.  In this regard, both British courts and courts under ML 
jurisdictions have given broad interpretation to arbitration agreements, 
favoring arbitral authority.46 This happens even in some extreme patho-
logical cases, such as the famous Lucky-Goldstar ruling rendered by Jus-
tice Kaplan in Hong Kong.47 Based on Professor Pieter Sanders’ obser-
vation of international commercial arbitration, this broader scope of 
                                                          
41 PIETER SANDERS, THE WORK OF UNCITRAL ON ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION 79-82 (2nd 
ed., 2004).
42 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 8(1).
43 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 
II, § 3, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739 [hereinafter New York Convention].
44 UKAA, art. 9(4).
45 ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 3-69 (2004).
46 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
47 In Lucky-Goldstar, the court held that despite the poorly drafted arbitration clause, it sufficiently 
indicated the parties’ intention to arbitrate.  See Lucky-Goldstar Int’l v. Ng. Moo Kee Eng’g 
Ltd., [1993] No. A94 ¶ 21 (C.A.).  See generally discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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judicial respect for arbitration prevalent in the international context has 
become part of a general trend where courts are increasingly willing to 
“recognize the preference of parties to have their commercial disputes 
decided in arbitration.”48
In China, however, the court has been vested with more judicial 
discretion in reviewing arbitration agreements.  The obvious difference 
between the Chinese regulations and international norms is that the AL 
lacks a transitional area of “operativeness/inoperativeness” through 
which the court’s mandatory stay has been restricted to circumstances of 
either nullity or invalidity of arbitration agreements.49  The omission of 
“inoperativeness” as the critical ground to opt-in/out-of the court’s juris-
diction surely enlarges the scope of judicial scrutiny.  As such, it restricts 
the room for judicial “support” whereby the court can take into account 
the surrounding circumstances to “imply” the parties’ intent to arbitrate.50  
Given the rigid validity requirements of the arbitration agreement under 
the AL,51 this may provide an excuse for Chinese courts to reject arbitral 
jurisdiction by adopting a strict textual interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement and consequently stay the arbitral proceedings in cases of “pa-
thological yet operative” arbitral clauses.  The legislative deficiency with 
regard to judicial power over arbitral jurisdiction raises the concern of 
excessive judicial intervention into arbitration.52  This helps to explain 
why the SPC has been busy issuing judicial interpretations regarding pa-
thological arbitration agreements and why it has been so vigorous in 
leading the reform of aligning Chinese arbitration standards with interna-
tional standards.
                                                          
48 SANDERS, supra note 41, at 73.
49 See Arbitration Law, arts. 5 & 26 (P.R.C.).
50 See Fei Gao, Support and Supervision Towards Arbitration by Chinese Courts 7 [Zhongguo 
fayuan dui zhongcai de zhichi yu jiandu], in ARBITRATION IN CHINA [ZHONGGUO ZHONGCAI] 6 
(2001).
51 See generally Arbitration Law, art. 16 (P.R.C.).
52 ZHIDONG CHEN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW [GUOJI SHANGSHI 
ZHONGCAI FA] 144 (1998).
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II.  SPC INITIATIVES TO LIMIT JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION: ALIGNMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION NORMS
In response to the international trend of giving more judicial re-
spect to arbitration, over the past decade the SPC has issued a long list of 
clarifications regarding how to exercise judicial supervision over arbitra-
tion agreements.  These clarifications have introduced reforms such as 
more cautious procedures reviewing arbitration agreements and a more 
liberal scope in exercising the review power.
A.  MORE CAUTIOUS PROCEDURE
The reform to implement more cautious procedures with respect 
to arbitration includes the introduction of the following schemes (1) the 
pre-reporting system, (2) an intermediate-level-above and collegiate-
panel system, and finally (3) a review-waiving system.
1. PRE-REPORTING SYSTEM
The SPC, through a series of notices in 1995 and 1998 (known 
as SPC Notices), established the “pre-reporting” system (yuxian baogao) 
among the people’s courts in reviewing the effect of foreign-related arbi-
tration agreements and arbitral awards.53  In accordance with these SPC 
Notices, the “pre-reporting” system can be sub-divided into three scena-
rios in arbitral cases involving foreign elements (1) before the SPC pro-
vides an official response, the lower people’s courts shall not announce 
the arbitration agreement to be null or void; (2) until the SPC provides an 
official response, the lower people’s court shall not rule to refuse the 
recognition and enforcement of the award; and (3) only after the SPC 
provides an official response can the lower people’s courts rule to deny 
the effect of arbitration agreements or arbitral awards.54
                                                          
53 See SPC Notice on Some Issues Concerning Foreign Arbitration and Arbitration in Foreign 
Countries, Fa Fa (1995) No. 18; SPC Notice on Regulations on the Fee and Time Limit of Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, Fa Shi (1998) No. 28; and SPC Notice 
on Some Issues Concerning Setting Aside Arbitration Awards Related to Foreign Elements by 
the People’s Court, Fa Fa (1998) No. 40.
54 See SPC Notices concerning foreign arbitration, supra note 53.
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The origin of the “pre-reporting” system arises from the dual-
track approach adopted by the AL, where preferential treatment has been 
reserved for foreign-related arbitration.  Based on this tradition, grounds 
for enforcing foreign-related awards are aligned with international stan-
dards and restricted to procedural review; however, domestic arbitral 
awards need to be subject to substantive as well as procedural checks.55  
Under these circumstances, because ineffective agreements are one of the 
grounds leading to the denial of enforcing foreign-related awards,56 a 
separate and preferential treatment regarding the judicial review over 
foreign-related arbitral agreements has been formed.  The “pre-
reporting” system has an interesting feature, which is to control the nega-
tive ruling of the lower people’s courts.  If the foreign-related arbitration 
agreement has been upheld and the arbitral award enforced at the lower 
level judiciary, then reporting is not at all necessary. With respect to ar-
bitration agreements, the “report” is mandatory only when the lower lev-
el people’s courts tend to negate the effect of the agreement.  Since there 
is no appellate procedure for rulings on matters of arbitral jurisdiction, 
the key importance of the “pre-reporting” is to prevent undue local influ-
ences over arbitration57 and to improve the enforceability of arbitral ju-
risdictions by setting up a “pyramidal internal supervisory mechanism 
within the judiciary” where the SPC can control the final result of re-
view.58  As Tao concludes, the system reflects the prudential attitude of 
the SPC towards arbitration agreements and is seen as a positive trend by
the SPC in leading the lower level people’s courts in China to support 
arbitration.59
The scheme, however, is not free from defects.  Obviously, it is 
only applicable to the foreign-related regime.  The quality of judicial re-
view over domestic agreements is not subject to the same examination.  
Thus, vast numbers of domestic arbitration agreements are still risky 
ventures, subject to the discretionary power of local judges.  Moreover, 
                                                          
55 Domestic awards in China will be checked on the grounds of errors of law, insufficiency of evi-
dence, and arbitrator misconduct.  See generally Arbitration Law, art. 63 (P.R.C.) and Civil Pro-
cedure Law, art. 217 (P.R.C.).  The grounds of foreign-related awards are limited to procedural 
irregularities.  See generally Arbitration Law, arts. 70, 71 (P.R.C.) and Civil Procedure Law, art. 
260 (P.R.C.).
56 Civil Procedure Law, art. 260(1) (P.R.C.).
57 See discussion infra Parts III, IV.D.1 regarding local administrative influence over arbitration.  
See discussion infra Part II.B.2 regarding local judicial influence over arbitration.
58 Shengchang Wang, Arbitration Agreement and its Validity Determination [Zhongcai xieyi jiqi 
xiaoli queding], in SYMPOSIUM ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE 
TAIWAN STRAITS [HAIXIA LIANG’AN JINGMAO ZHONGCAI YANTAOHUI WENJI] 39 (2001).
59 JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 58 (2004).
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the timeline is unclear for such “report.”  In SPC Notices regarding the 
“pre-reporting” system, there are only time limits provided for the judi-
cial review of awards.  The intermediate people’s court shall report to the 
higher people’s court its decision to revoke or set aside within thirty days 
of the party’s enforcement period; the higher people’s court shall, by the 
same token, report to the SPC within fifteen days of its decision.60  I have 
to clarity that the “vague timelines” only refer to “timelines of pre-
reporting system applicable to arbitration agreements.” In terms of “pre-
reporting of arbitral awards,” the timeline is clear enough, as has been set 
out the in the text.  However, none of the SPC Notices that have been is-
sued have mentioned the time limits for the review of arbitration agree-
ments.  Absent this time limit, arbitral efficiency is hard to protect.  Im-
agine that no timelines have been set for reporting and pre-reporting (of 
judicial review of arbitral agreements), parties whose agreements have 
been turned down at lower level courts will have endless waits before 
they get answered from higher level courts. That certainly runs contrary 
to the efficiency argument of arbitration.
2. INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL-ABOVE AND COLLEGIAL-PANEL SYSTEM
Subsequent to the introduction of the “pre-reporting” system, in 
2000, in a reply to the Shandong Higher People’s Court, the SPC an-
nounced that any motion challenging the effect of foreign-related arbitra-
tion agreements must be made before the people’s court at either the in-
termediate level or above.61  Furthermore, the SPC now mandates that 
any jurisdictional challenge on the basis of a non-existent or invalid arbi-
tration agreement, irrespective of whether it is foreign-related or domes-
tic, will be received by the intermediate people’s court under Article 12 
of the SPC Interpretations on Arbitration Law in 2006 (SPC Interpreta-
tion).62  Generally, intermediate courts are equipped with better qualified 
                                                          
60 See SPC Notices concerning foreign arbitration, supra note 53.
61 SPC Reply to the Shandong Higher People’s Court on “Which Level of People’s Court Shall 
Handle the Jurisdictional Challenge of the Validity of Arbitration Agreements,” Fa Shi (2000) 
No. 25.
62 It should be noted that Article 10 of the Domestic Draft still bifurcates the court level system in 
reviewing the arbitration agreement.  See Domestic Draft, July 22, 2004, available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=124300 (last visited June 2, 2009).  On the other 
hand, the 2006 SPC Interpretation appears to take matters to a broader horizon.  See Interpreta-
tion of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Several Matters on Application of the Arbitra-
tion Law (P.R.C) (adopted at the 1375th meeting of the Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., 
Dec. 26, 2005, effective Sept. 8, 2006), art. 12 [hereinafter SPC Interpretation], available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show.php?file_id=112964 (last visited June 6, 2009).
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and more experienced judges as compared with district courts.63 Moving 
jurisdictional review to the intermediate court could help downplay the 
local influences and better protect the quality of judicial review.64
In addition, a collegiate-panel mechanism has now been intro-
duced under Article 15 of the SPC Interpretation, which requires the 
people’s court to form a collegiate panel to conduct the examination of 
arbitration agreements.65  This provision66 adds further “caution” to the 
procedure of judicial review over arbitration agreements. For the first 
time in the Chinese arbitration history, the effect of arbitration cases, al-
beit very simple ones with small amounts of money involved, may be 
considered by the collective wisdom of three judges.67  Although the pro-
vision may be questioned with respect to the allocation of judicial re-
sources, generally this is seen as a welcomed development because it will 
increase the likelihood of parties’ arbitral wishes being upheld.
3.  REVIEW-WAIVING SYSTEM
In an attempt to further address the concerns of prioritized judi-
cial review under the AL and the SPC Reply, Article 13 of the SPC In-
terpretation restates the relationship between the arbitration commission 
and the people’s courts in the case of a competing jurisdiction:
Pursuant to Article 20 of the AL, where a party does not object to the 
validity of an arbitration agreement prior to the tribunal commences 
the first hearing of the case, but later applies to the people’s court for 
announcing the invalidity of the agreement, the people’s court shall 
not accept the case.  If an arbitration commission has made its ruling
on the effect of an arbitration agreement, any application made by a 
party to the people’s court for setting aside the decision of the com-
mission shall not be entertained by the people’s court.68
The most recent SPC Interpretation clarifies when judicial review could 
be exercised upon the arbitration agreement, i.e., before the first hearing 
                                                          
63 Judges Law of the P.R.C. (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 26, 2006), art. 9(6), 
available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2692.
64 TAO, supra note 59, at 144-46.
65 SPC Interpretation, supra note 62, art. 15.
66 There have been no counterpart provisions in either the Foreign-Related Draft or Domestic Draft 
to address the number of the judges in exercising the judicial review.  See Domestic Draft, supra
note 62; Foreign-Related Draft, Dec. 31, 2003, available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=97517&show_all_img=1 (last visited June 2, 
2009).
67 SPC Interpretation, supra note 62, art. 15.
68 Id. art. 13.
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of the arbitral tribunal,69 and where the arbitration commission has not 
ruled on the effect of the agreement.70  This SPC arrangement is called a 
“review-waiving” system and is a contribution to the international arbi-
tration jurisprudence on the finality of the jurisdictional determination by 
the arbitral body.71  That is, the people’s court would waive its supervi-
sory power once the effect of the arbitral agreement has been decided by 
the arbitration commission and such a decision is considered “final” with 
no further chance of judicial review.72  The “review-waiving” system, 
cited by Professor Xiaohong Liu of East China University of Political 
Science and Law, is an extreme case of the SPC’s approach to minimize 
judicial intervention with regard to the ruling of arbitral jurisdiction.73  
Other commentators, however, argue that it deprives the parties the right 
of judicial recourse on the issue of arbitral jurisdiction, and therefore it is 
not compatible with the international stipulations.74 Generally, this 
should be a welcome development. Once the arbitration commission has 
ruled on the validity of the arbitral agreement, it will bring certainty and 
finality to its effect. However, it is not clear whether arbitral proceedings
could continue, pending the jurisdictional challenge before the court, 
prior to the tribunal rules on the jurisdiction.  The latest SPC Interpreta-
tion fails to address the point.  Therefore, it may be argued that “priori-
tized” judicial review still exists in some stage of the arbitral proceeding.
                                                          
69 See Arbitration Law, art. 20 (P.R.C.).
70 SPC Reply (1998) No. 27, supra note 11, art. 3(1).
71 Xingjun Ge, Brief Comments on the Judicial Supervision Over Arbitration and Improvement of 
Arbitration System [Jianshu zhongcai sifa jiandu yu zhongcai zhidu de wanshan], in JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF THE FOREIGN-RELATED ARBITRATION [SHEWAI ZHONGCAI SIFA SHENCHA] 16-17 
(2006).
72 SPC Interpretation, supra note 62, art. 13.
73 LIU, supra note 36, at 117.
74 Since neither Article 58 of the AL nor Article 260 of the CPL provides for “invalidity of the arbi-
tration agreement” as one ground to revoke the arbitral award, Zhao considers that if the court 
waives the judicial supervision after the tribunal rules on the validity of the arbitration agree-
ment, then it is equal to the court’s depriving the parties of the right of judicial resort on the point 
of jurisdictional challenge on the basis of an invalid arbitration agreement determined by the 
commission.  See XIUWEN ZHAO, Arbitral Seat and Judicial Supervision [Zhongcai didian yu si-
fa jiandu], in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FOREIGN-RELATED ARBITRATION, supra note 71, at 51.
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B.  MORE LIBERAL SCOPE
1. MORE REMEDIABLE PATHOLOGIES
Over the past decade, great progress has been made in liberaliz-
ing the scope of arbitration agreements via SPC’s issuing judicial inter-
pretations with respect to defective arbitration agreements.75
On the one hand, the SPC no longer adheres to the signature-
based writing and a more expansive scope of the “written agreement” has 
been introduced.76  Besides “incorporation by reference,”77 the SPC, cor-
responding with the recently published Contract Law (CL), also recog-
nized the effect of arbitration agreements in circumstances of contract 
transfer and as such can extend its effect to non-signatory third parties.78
On the other hand, many drafting defects with respect to “clear and une-
quivocal arbitral commission or institution” have been stated as remedia-
ble and operative.  Most recently, by virtue of its Interpretation in 2006, 
the SPC mandates that prescribing the institutional rules will be suffi-
cient to indicate the choice of the arbitral institution which administers 
the rules.79  Moreover, unclear drafting in regards to the “arbitral institu-
tion” may be held valid so long as the institutional identity can be rea-
sonably ascertainable from the surrounding context.80
The interpretations by China’s highest judiciary show more re-
spect to parties’ drafting autonomy in arbitration and helps to bridge the 
gap between the AL and international arbitration norms.  The practical 
reality of the SPC-led reform, for example, enforcement of defective ar-
bitration agreements, will be examined in Section IV of this article.
2.  FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN APPLICABLE LAW
In international commercial arbitration, finding the law applica-
ble to the arbitration agreement is a pre-condition in determining its va-
                                                          
75 See, e.g., a list of SPC replies [pifu], notices [tongzhi], and opinions [yijian] issued by the Su-
preme People’s Court regarding the interpretation of defective arbitration agreements in 
ARBITRATION LAW AND PERTAINING REGULATIONS [ZHONGCAIFA JI PEITAO GUIDING] (Dehua 
Tang & Xiujun Sun eds., 2005).
76 SPC Interpretation, supra note 62, art. 1.
77 Id. art. 11.
78 Id. arts. 8, 9.
79 Id. art. 4.
80 Id. art. 3.
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lidity.  However, in many cases, parties may forget to spell out the go-
verning law of their arbitration agreements.  Where the jurisdictional 
challenge is brought before the people’s court, the Chinese judges used 
to apply universally the lex fori (law of the reviewing court) in determin-
ing the effect of the arbitration agreement.81  Hence, the arbitral jurisdic-
tion may easily be turned down due to the rigid requirements imposed on 
the validity of the agreement by the AL.82  According to Article 145 of 
the CL, parties can choose foreign law as the governing law only if the 
contract involves foreign elements.83  The AL fails to provide a conflict 
of law rule—which law should be used to determine the validity of for-
eign-related arbitration agreements—and the SPC tries to fill in the regu-
latory gap.84
In 1999, the SPC first announced its opinion in a rather informal 
way that absent the parties’ choice of law applicable to their arbitration 
agreements, the validity should be determined according to the lex arbitri
(law of place of arbitration).85  Later, in a more formal manner, Article 17 
of the Foreign-Related Draft provided a detailed roadmap of the applica-
ble law in determining the validity of an arbitration agreement that the 
people’s court shall apply:
(1) the “law” agreed upon by the parties; or
(2) if the parties have not agreed on the “applicable law” of the arbi-
tration agreement but have agreed on the place of arbitration (arbitral 
seat),86 the law of the arbitral seat, the lex arbitri; or
                                                          
81 Adam Li & George Wang, Conflict of Law Issues in Ascertaining Validity of an Arbitration 
Agreement, in ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 81, 89 (Jerome Cohen et al. eds., 
2004).
82 Arbitration Law, arts. 16, 18 (P.R.C.).  A valid arbitration agreement in China must designate a 
Chinese arbitration commission clearly and unequivocally.  Id.
83 Contract Law (Promulgated by the Second Session of the Ninth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 
1999, effective Mar. 15, 1999) (P.R.C.).  Therefore, in the domestic setting, there is no question 
whether the Chinese AL will apply in determining the validity of the arbitration agreements.  On 
the other hand, while the AL does not mention the conflict of law rules for determining the valid-
ity of foreign agreements, “the governing law will be determined according to the choice of the 
parties; absent the choice, the law that has the closest connection to the contract is the applicable 
law.” Id.
84 See discussions infra Parts III, IV.
85 Mitsubishi Co. Ltd. (HK) v. Sanxia Inv. Co. Ltd. and Hubei Mech. Eng’g Co. Ltd., Zui Gao Fa Fa 
Jing Han [1999] No. 143, reprinted in JIANLIN ZHU, COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CASES [GUOJI SHANGSHI ZHONGCAI ANLI PINGXI]
375-377 (2002).
86 Sometimes the arbitral seat is called arbitral situs, which is the Latin expression of arbitral seat 
where the arbitral proceedings are held.
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(3) if the parties have neither agreed on the arbitral seat or the arbitral 
seat is not made clear from the arbitration agreement, the law of the 
court that received the application of jurisdictional review, the lex fo-
ri.87
In the most recent SPC Interpretations in 2006, Article 16 confirms the 
three-step formula taken under the Foreign-Related Draft.88  The clarifi-
cation accords with the general principle of party autonomy espoused 
under Articles 19 and 28 of the ML which permits the parties to freely 
select and determine both the substantial law and procedural rules to be 
followed during the arbitral proceedings.89
III.  UNRESOLVED JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: DUAL-
TRACK CONCERNS
In the initial stage, the AL authorized the people’s courts priori-
tized right of review in procedure and more stringent review in scope 
with respect to arbitration agreements.  This deviates from international 
arbitration norms and raises the issue of excessive judicial intervention in 
Chinese arbitration.90  The SPC, therefore, has taken a series of measures 
to bridge the gap.  On the one hand, a more cautious judicial approach 
has been adopted in the procedure of review where in some extreme cir-
cumstances people’s courts may even waive their supervisory power if 
the arbitration commission has made a ruling on the validity of the arbi-
tral agreement.91  On the other hand, more liberal interpretations on the 
scope of validity have been introduced for the more liberal exercise of 
judicial supervision.
Despite the impressive regulatory progress made by the SPC in 
minimizing judicial intervention, it should be noted that the degree of 
judicial caution varies substantially between the two tracks.  Preferential 
treatment has been reserved for the foreign-related track.92  Judicial re-
                                                          
87 Foreign-Related Draft, supra note 66, art. 17.
88 SPC Interpretation, supra note 62, art. 16.
89 Article 19 of the ML gives the parties’ the full freedom in choosing the procedural rules.  See
UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 19.  Article 28 of the ML permits the parties full autonomy in se-
lecting the law applicable to their substantive dispute.  See UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 28(1).
90 See discussion supra Part I.B.
91 SPC Interpretation, supra note 62, art. 13.  See discussion supra Part II.A.3, regarding the “re-
view-waiving” system.
92 Foreign-related arbitration in China will only be subject to procedural review by the people’s 
courts.  Arbitration Law, arts. 58, 63 (P.R.C.); Civil Procedure Law, art. 217 (P.R.C.).  On the 
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view over the foreign-related regime will be extra-protected under the 
“pre-reporting” system.93 Although the handling court is now upgraded 
to intermediate level; foreign-related cases must be reported to the higher 
level people’s court for approval if the lower court negates the effect of 
arbitration agreements or arbitral awards.94  The “pre-reporting” system, 
by centralizing the reviewing power, would be important to prevent the 
rampant local protectionism found in Chinese judicial practice.95
However, the “pre-reporting” system has serious shortcomings.  
First, the system consists of a purely internal supervision method.  The 
parties are neither notified about the “report” nor have a chance to partic-
ipate in the hearing held by the higher level people’s court.96  Therefore, 
the decision-making process lacks transparency. Without the parties’ 
right of access to the judicial proceeding, it could lead to due process 
concerns.  In addition, allowing one case to go through limitless reviews 
may be an inefficient use of judicial resources.  More importantly, the 
pre-reporting works like the referral system (qinshi) within the hierarchy 
of the Chinese judiciary where higher level people’s courts can influence 
the decision of the lower levels.  Thus, it harms judicial independence.  
Lastly, and most controversially, the system is not available to the do-
mestic regime.
The fact that standards for enforcing domestic awards are stricter 
than foreign-related awards suggests that the domestic regime is more 
difficult to enforce.97  Specifically, in an empirical study conducted by 
Professor Randall Peerenboom, among the sixty-three domestic awards 
handled by one court in a large city in Jiangsu Province, two were re-
fused and thirty-five were listed as pending.98  Hence, the domestic re-
gime needs careful judicial review as well—at least no less than its for-
eign-related counterpart.99  The different treatment by the SPC raises 
serious concerns with respect to the dual-track system.  Disparate treat-
                                                          
other hand, domestic arbitration is subject to substantive review even on those matters such as 
the authenticity of evidence, etc.
93 See discussion supra Part II.A.1. regarding the “pre-reporting” system.
94 Id.
95 See discussion infra Parts IV.C.3, IV.C.4.
96 See SPC Notices concerning foreign arbitration, supra note 53.
97 See, e.g. Arbitration Law, arts. 63, 70, 71 (P.R.C.); Civil Procedure Law, arts. 217, 260 (P.R.C.).  
See also supra note 55.
98 Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 284 n.108 (2001).
99 For example, the scope of judicial review in domestic arbitration shall be restricted to the proce-
dural review and the application of the “pre-reporting” system.
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ment could potentially lead to discrimination by people’s courts from the 
beginning (arbitration agreement) to the end (arbitral award) with respect 
to the rights and autonomy of parties seeking domestic arbitration.
IV.  ENFORCEMENT ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL 
APPLICATION OF THE SPC INITIATIVES
This section will analyze the enforcement reports of the SPC’s 
pro-arbitration initiatives by seeking truth from facts.  The enforcement 
samples collected in this section have been divided into two groups ac-
cording to the different types of defectiveness (1) those of “non-signatory 
third party,” and (2) those of “ambiguous arbitration commission.”  Re-
ports by people’s courts at different levels and localities will be ex-
amined pertaining to both groups.
A couple of issues must be borne in mind.  In China, judicial re-
view over arbitral jurisdiction has been restricted to the pre-award 
stage.100  Thus, enforcement reports with respect to arbitration agree-
ments are generally unavailable to the public.  However, because of the 
“pre-reporting” system in the foreign-related regime, some negative rul-
ings on arbitral agreements by the local people’s court become accessible 
through the SPC’s publication of its “replies of jurisdiction” in the Ga-
zette.  The following discussion is, therefore, only examining “negative” 
cases and limited to the “foreign-related regime.”  Nevertheless, it sheds 
light on the rulings of the domestic regime and may highlight practical 
constraints in the enforcement of arbitral agreements in both  domestic 
and foreign cases.
Moreover, during the transition from a planned to a market 
economy and in the process of developing the rule of law in China, the 
entire judiciary is faced with many challenges.  The lack of judicial inte-
grity and quality and the unbalanced development among the people’s 
courts in different areas of the country may all contribute to the divergent 
enforcement records both in court judgments and arbitral awards.101  
These problems are also reflected in the area of enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements.
                                                          
100 See discussion supra Part I.A regarding the time limit of judicial review that can be exercised 
over arbitral jurisdiction in China.
101 For an example of these arguments, see Jerome Cohen, China’s Legal Reform at the Crossroads, 
FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Mar. 2006, 23-25.
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A.  ENFORCEMENT CONCERNING “NON-SIGNATORY THIRD PARTIES”
The SPC has articulated a number of occasions in which transfer 
of legal rights and obligations of a party under an arbitration agreement 
should not invalidate the effect of the agreement such that it will still 
bind the non-signatory transferee.102  Misunderstanding and mishandling 
have nevertheless been found in the local judicial application.
1.  LONGHAI CASE: MISAPPLICATION OF SEPARABILITY
In 1993, the Hong Kong Longhai Company (Longhai) and Wu-
han Donghu Import and Export Company (Donghu) signed an equity 
joint venture (EJV) contract in which a China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) arbitration clause was in-
cluded.  In December, Donghu assigned all its equities to Wuhan Zhon-
gyuan Scientific Company (Zhongyuan) and left the EJV.  Then Longhai 
and Zhongyuan signed a new EJV contract where Zhongyuan agreed to 
take over all the rights and obligations of Donghu in the original EJV 
contract.  In 1998, a dispute arose out of the investment share between 
Longhai and Zhongyuan. Longhai applied to CIETAC arbitration in Bei-
jing when Zhongyuan challenged the arbitral jurisdiction before the Wu-
han Intermediate People’s Court.
The Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court ruled that the arbitration 
clause was not binding upon Zhongyuan on the basis that “the arbitration 
clause has independent character so that the clause in the original con-
tract has no legal force upon the new assignee. Therefore the CIETAC 
jurisdiction is rejected.”103  Upon reporting, the Hubei Higher People’s 
Court replied that the arbitration agreement should survive the contract 
assignment and the CIETAC jurisdiction was affirmed.104
This case reflects how a local people’s court misapplied the se-
parability rules. The doctrine of separability of arbitration agreements 
refers to separation of arbitration clauses from the “effect” of main con-
tracts so that the non-existence or invalidity of the main contract will not 
                                                          
102 The judicial guidance has been endorsed by the SPC early in its replies to the Hubei and Henan 
Higher People’s Courts in 1997 and 1999 respectively and has been confirmed in the SPC Inter-
pretation in 2006. SPC Interpretation, supra note 62, arts. 8, 9.  For the SPC Hubei and Henan 
Replies, see Wang Shengchang, Arbitration Agreements and its Validity, in SYMPOSIUM ESSAYS 
ON ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION ACROSS THE STRAITS [HAIXIA LIANG’AN JINGMAO 
ZHONGCAI YANTAOHUI WENJI] 15-20 (CIETAC China Law Press, 2001).
103 Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Civil Adjudication (1998) No. 0277.
104 Hubei Higher People’s Ct. (1999) E Fa Shen Jian Jing Zai Zi.
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affect that of the arbitration clause.105  Textually, however, the arbitral 
clause is part of the main contract such that transfer of the main contract 
will include transfer of the arbitral clause, unless otherwise provided.  
Therefore, although the arbitration clause and main contract are deemed 
to be two separate agreements in validity considerations, the former is 
textually attached to the latter.106  As such, the arbitration clause shall be 
valid and binding on the non-signatory third party if it has been deemed
valid before the transfer.  In the case above, the new investor (Zhon-
gyuan) has succeeded all of the rights and obligations from the original 
investor (Longhai) where a valid CIETAC arbitral clause forms a part.  
The intermediate court wrongfully applied the separability doctrine be-
tween “textual composition” and “validity effect” with respect to the re-
lationship between the arbitral clause and its main contract.  As a result, 
this led to the denial of the arbitral jurisdiction.  The Longhai case raises
concerns with respect to the correct understanding of modern arbitration 
norms at the lower level people’s courts.
2.  HUAXIANG CASE: SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETIONS
In July 1997, Qingdao Huaqiang International Trade Company 
(A), the Japan Beitiaoli Chemical Research Institute, and the Japan Zhu-
neitiegong Company invested together in establishing the Qingdao Hua-
xiang Joint Venture (BJV).  Article 38 of the JV contract provided that 
“any dispute among the three investing parties regarding the investment 
contract shall be resolved by CIETAC according to its rules.”  In Sep-
tember 2001, upon the agreement by the three investing parties, Hua-
qiang assigned its entire 35 percent share in the JV to the Qingdao Hua-
qiangda Technical Company (C).  Later, C withdrew all its investment
from the BJV.  B sued C for violating the investment obligations under 
the original JV contract.  Before the first statement on defense, C raised 
jurisdictional challenge to the Qingdao Intermediate People’s Court.  The 
challenge was based on the arbitration clause found in the original JV 
contract which stated that CIETAC should be the proper venue for dis-
pute resolution.
                                                          
105 Pierre Mayer, The Limits of Severability of the Arbitration Clause, in IMPROVING THE 
EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION 261 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999).
106 Guangqing Qu, Xiaoyun Chen & Lei Xing, Thinking of the Effect of the Arbitration Clause un-
der the Contract Transfer–Comments on the Hong Kong Longhai Co. v. Wuhan Zhongyuan Co., 
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION REVIEW [GUOJI SHANGSHI ZHENGYI 
JIEJUE LUNCONG] 90 (2004).
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In September 2003, in ruling on the validity of the arbitration 
clause between B and C, the opinions were divided within Qingdao In-
termediate Court.107  The first group opined that “the rights and obliga-
tions of dispute resolution should accompany the general transfer of the 
rights and obligations of the investment contract so that the arbitration 
clause should be enforceable upon C and B.”  The second group was of 
the opinion that “the arbitration clause had independent nature and thus 
the share transfer could not necessarily lead to the transfer of dispute res-
olution clause unless it was expressly agreed by the transferee.”  The In-
termediate Court finally referred to the “Beijing Opinion 1999” in resolv-
ing the dilemma.  Article 3 of the “Beijing Opinion 1999”  provided that: 
“If there is an arbitration agreement among the investing parties for re-
solving the dispute(s) arising out of the investment, that arbitration 
agreement will not be binding between the investor and JV investee.”108  
Hence, the CIETAC jurisdiction was denied.109  The Shandong Higher 
People’s Court,110 on the basis of the “Beijing Opinion 1999,” confirmed 
the ruling of the Qingdao Intermediate Court through the reporting sys-
tem.111  In the final stage of the reporting, in its reply to the Shandong 
Higher People’s Court, the SPC confirmed the court jurisdiction and held 
that:
Since the BJV has not taken part in the negotiations of the JV in-
vestment contract where the arbitration clause forms a part, the arbi-
tration agreement within the JV contract will not carry effect upon 
the non-investing party who did not involve in the performance of the 
JV contract.112
Several points may be observed from the Huaxiang case. First, 
like the Longhai case in the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court, misun-
derstanding as to the principle of separability also existed in the Qingdao 
Intermediate Court.113  The coincidence may, to some extent, reflect the 
                                                          
107 Qingdao Interm. People’s Ct. Civil Adjudication (2004) No. 068.
108 Beijing Judicial Opinion on the Handling of Arbitration Cases, art. 3, promulgated Oct. 1999, 
(Beijing Higher People’s Ct.) mandates that arbitral agreements signed by investors will not bind 
the investee JV.
109 Supra note 107.
110 The Shandong Higher People’s Court is the highest judicial authority in the Shandong Province 
where the Qingdao city resides.
111 Petition to the Sup. People’s Ct. in Determining the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement in a 
JV Contract, Shandong Higher People’s Ct, Lu Gao Fa [2004] No. 203.
112 SPC Reply to the Shandong Higher People’s Court Concerning the Validity of the Arbitration 
Agreement in a JV Contract, Zui Gao Fa [2004] Min Si Ta Zi No. 41.
113 See, e.g., the second group of opinions within Qingdao Interm. People’s Ct. Civil Adjudication 
(2004) No. 068.
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poor knowledge of modern arbitration by lower level courts.  Since Wu-
han and Qingdao are upper mid-level Chinese cities, their judicial quality 
with respect to handling of arbitration cases indicates the average quality 
of local Chinese judges with respect to understanding arbitration norms.  
In addition, when the SPC criterion is unclear, the enforcement record 
could be subject to the discretionary interpretative power by the local 
judges themselves.  According to the facts, the arbitration clause was 
agreed to resolve disputes among the investors.  The transfer of the share 
may thus justify C’s arbitral locus standi should a dispute arise between
C and the other two Japanese investors, in accordance with the then SPC 
guidelines.114  However, the SPC failed to provide whether such an arbi-
tration clause could extend its effect to the investee—the JV—which is a
non-signatory third party to the original investment contract when the ar-
bitration clause was included.
Two further issues arise within this context.  First, quoting the 
views of the second group in the Qingdao Intermediate Court, it seems 
that in order for the arbitration clause to survive the contractual assign-
ment and be effective upon the investor assignee, it must be expressly 
agreed to by the assignee.115  If we recall the SPC judicial interpretations, 
the arbitration clause shall be enforceable upon the assignee as long as
the assignee is aware of the arbitral clause during the contract assign-
ment.116 International arbitration norms have also suggested a similar ap-
proach in determining the validity of arbitration clauses undergoing the 
contractual assignment or subrogation.117 This raises the issue of compa-
tibility of judicial opinions between the local judiciary and the SPC.
Apart from the issue of justice, such as whether the share assignment in 
this case would involve transfer of some onerous obligations, it seems
that Qingdao Intermediate Court sets a higher burden of proof upon the 
assignee than the SPC does in invoking the arbitration agreement.  Since 
most parties would not bother to specifically agree to the dispute resolu-
tion clause during the contractual transfer, the Qingdao approach may 
constitute an undue burden on the assignee to resort to arbitration.  Thus, 
despite the SPC’s pro-arbitration guideline, it might in its practical appli-
cation, be subject to local understandings as the aforementioned case 
demonstrates.
                                                          
114 Foreign-Related Draft, supra note 66, arts. 27, 28; Domestic Draft, supra note 62, arts. 1, 2.
115 Id.
116 Foreign-Related Draft, supra note 66, arts. 27, 28; Domestic Draft, supra note 62, arts. 1, 2.
117 Norbert Horn, The Arbitration Agreement in Light of Case Law of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
8(5) INT’L ARB. L. REV. 148 (2005).
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Second, based on the holding history, both the Qingdao Interme-
diate and Shandong Higher People’s Courts have referred to the “Beijing 
Opinion 1999” for authority in determining the enforceability of the arbi-
tration clause upon the investee JV.118  However, controversy arises re-
garding whether local judicial opinions could be applicable to judicial 
practices outside the issuing jurisdiction, although there are no restric-
tions under the Chinese jurisprudence to not  do so.  It shall be noted 
that, in China, only the SPC has de facto rule-making power where its 
judicial interpretations carry the force of law.119  The underlying rationale 
is to supervise and unify the judicial behavior across the country via the 
hierarchical arrangement of the judiciary.120  Hence, the applicability of 
the local judicial opinion outside its issuing jurisdiction may still be a 
lingering issue not only in the area of arbitration but also in the general 
Chinese judicial practice.  In essence, it is important to note that the two 
issues discussed above reflect the problems created by the uncertain 
scope of local judicial discretions in enforcing  arbitration agreements.  
The uncertain scope could be wider or narrower, depending on how the 
local court perceives arbitration and whether the SPC guideline is clear 
enough for reference.
3.  BAOTOU CASE: LOCAL INTERESTS AS REAL CONSIDERATION
In September 2005, A Building Company (A) and B Commercial 
Company (B) signed a building contract where A agreed to construct a 
three-story commercial building for B in Baotou city, Neimenggu Auto-
nomous Region.  Both parties further agreed that “any dispute relating to 
the performance of this contract will be resolved by the arbitration com-
mission in the place of construction.”  Later, B refused to pay A because 
of the unsatisfactory quality of the building constructed.  A resorted to 
the Baotou Arbitration Commission for dealing with the contractual dis-
pute.  In January 2006, after holding several hearings, the arbitration 
commission ruled in favor of A, and therefore B was asked to pay the 
money.  In February 2006, in enforcing the arbitral award, Company C 
(C) challenged the award to the Baotou Intermediate People’s Court on 
                                                          
118 Beijing Judicial Opinion on the Handling of Arbitration Cases, art. 3, promulgated Oct. 1999, 
(Beijing Higher People’s Ct.).
119 Article 33 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts (P.R.C.) confirms SPC’s de facto rule-
making power.  See supra note 16.
120 NANPING LIU, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS IN CHINA: OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S 
COURT 24-25 (1997).
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the ground that the arbitration clause should be voided.  C argued that B 
had dissolved and merged into C at the time of concluding the arbitration 
agreement.  Since C had never signed any arbitration agreement with A, 
C should not be bound by the award between A and B.
In March 2006, in deciding whether the merger was true or not, 
the Baotou Intermediate People’s Court examined the commercial back-
ground of both B and C. During the examination, the court found that C 
was conducting the key government-supported business (zhengfu zhong-
dian fuchi chanye),121 and the award enforcement could affect C’s work-
ing capital and lead to its cash flow problem.  The Baotou Intermediate 
Court finally declared the arbitration agreement invalid and denied the 
award accordingly on the basis that:
The arbitration agreement could not extend to the third party.  Due to 
the dissolution of B, a contractual relationship existed only between 
A and C. However, since A and C had not reached a new arbitration 
agreement, the original arbitration clause without C’s participation 
would not be enforceable against C.122
The negative ruling was reported all the way to the SPC where it finally 
reversed the rulings of both the Baotou Intermediate and Neimenggu 
Higher People’s Courts,123 holding that the arbitration clause should suc-
ceed the merger and be effective upon the successor.124
A pair of issues may be observed from the Baotou enforcement 
report.  First, in China, it is still doubtful whether an invalid arbitration 
agreement can be a ground to revoke the arbitral award.125  As illustrated 
before, people’s courts can review arbitration agreements only before the 
arbitral tribunal has its first hearing on the proceeding.126 Accordingly, 
the judicial review conducted in the current case may have arguably ex-
                                                          
121 The local government, in developing the commercial economy in the given locality, will promote 
a series of preferential policies to support some businesses so as to attract investment and talents.  
For example, many of the central provinces in China have taken the information technology en-
terprises as the supporting objects.
122 Baotou Interm. Ct. Civil Adjudication (2006) No. 024.
123 The Neimenggu Higher People’s Court is the highest judicial authority in the Neimenggu Auto-
nomous Region where the Baotou city resides.
124 See a compilation of online comments in Zhiqing Xu & Shu Dai, Merger of the Company: Is the 
Original Arbitration Clause Still Effective [Gongsi bei jianbin, yuan zhongcai tiaokuan shifou 
renran youxiao], China Arbitration, http://www.china-arbitration.com (last visited Mar. 10, 
2009).  See also SPC Reply to the Neimenggu Higher People’s Court, Fa Jing (2006) No. 19 
Han.
125 In denying the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in China, the ground in relation to 
arbitral agreements only encompass situations as to non-existent agreements rather than invalid 
agreements.  See Arbitration Law, art. 58 (P.R.C.).  See also supra Part I.B.1.
126 See Arbitration Law, arts. 20, 26 (P.R.C.).  See also supra Part I.A.
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ceeded the timeframe required by the AL and SPC interpretations.127  In 
addition, as the AL and SPC interpretations have never expressly ob-
jected to judicial review taking place during or after the arbitral proceed-
ing, there may be room available for judicial discretions.
The second and more contentious issue relates to how the local 
judiciary exercises their judicial discretion; i.e., the actual factors they 
consider in allowing or denying the arbitral jurisdiction.  Based on the 
facts, the Baotou Intermediate Court took into account the merits of the 
case, particularly the economic status of the arbitral party, in determining 
the effect of the arbitration agreement and its subsequent arbitral 
award.128 Given that C is a key local enterprise receiving government
support it is highly probable that C’s business is associated with local 
economic interests.  If it lost the case the government would have to pay 
the debt.129  While it is not uncommon for the court to check the merits of 
the case in ascertaining arbitral jurisdiction, it is rare for the court to give 
weight to the party’s economic status or its relationship to the govern-
ment.  It might, therefore, be argued that if the party is a very important 
company in the given region, the arbitration agreement could be checked 
because being involved in a claim might harm the company’s business 
reputation and be detrimental to local economic interests.  By controlling 
arbitration agreements, the local court may indirectly control the result of 
arbitration and thereby help to protect local interests and save state-
owned enterprises.130 These issues, however, raise the concern of fair 
play in the actual enforcement of arbitration in China.  Local people’s 
courts have the discretion to extend the period of judicial review.  In ad-
dition, they can take local interests into consideration as a ground for de-
nying arbitral jurisdiction and the outcome of arbitration.  This results in 
low enforcement rates of arbitration agreements and subsequent arbitral 
awards in some parts of the country.
                                                          
127 Even if the official SPC Interpretation did not come out when the case occurred, the Domestic 
Draft also required the exercise of judicial review be restricted to the stage before the first hear-
ing of the arbitral tribunal.  See Domestic Draft, supra note 62, art. 8.
128 See supra note 122, regarding the facts of the Baotou case.
129 Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China from a U.S. Judg-
ment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757 (2004).
130 Weixia Gu, Recourse against Arbitral Awards: How Far Can a Court Go? Supportive and Su-
pervisory Role of Hong Kong Courts as Lessons to Mainland China Arbitration, 4 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 481, 497 (2005).
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4.  CASE SUMMARY
The cases above, to some extent, reflect the difficulties in enforc-
ing arbitration agreements.  But for the pre-reporting system, all these 
agreements could have been voided under the local judicial examina-
tions.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the case discussions.  
First, as is shown from both the Longhai and Huaxiang case, notwith-
standing the liberal approach developed by the SPC in the past decade, 
local judges lack knowledge of modern arbitration theories, and this 
practice results in a misunderstanding of the doctrine of separability.  
Second, when the SPC guideline is not clear enough, there is uncertainty
regarding the scope of judicial supervision in which case the extent of the 
supervision depends on how the local judiciary understands arbitration.  
This was reflected in the Huaxiang case where the local people’s court 
adopted a rigid interpretation of the effect of an arbitration agreement 
when the arbitral parties have undergone merges. The same applies to the 
Baotou case, where the procedural timeframe of review was extended by 
local judicial discretion.131  Third, the judicial check may involve exami-
nation into some merit details and even economic standing of the arbitral 
parties.  As demonstrated by the Baotou case, although it is highly doubt-
ful whether local economic interests could be applied as a determining 
factor in exercising the judicial scrutiny, in practice the court has in-
cluded this factor when assessing a case.
Other problems may also be relevant within the context of these 
judicial enforcement reports, such as the interplay between local judicial 
opinions and SPC’s judicial interpretations, and the consistency among 
the local judicial practices in different parts of China.  The AL fails to set 
out any rules to deal with these issues, and the subsequent SPC Interpre-
tations fail to improve the situation.
B. ENFORCEMENT OF “AMBIGUOUS ARBITRATION COMMISSION”
The second group of case reports is concerned with defective ar-
bitration agreements without including a “definite arbitration commis-
sion.”  Therefore, this part of the article will examine the extent to which 
local people’s courts have enforced these agreements pursuant to the 
SPC’s liberal instruction on “ascertainable arbitration commission.”
                                                          
131 See supra note 122, regarding the judicial reasoning of the Baotou case.
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1. WEIGE CASE: INTERPRETATIVE TECHNIQUES
In 1994, the Taiwan Fuyuan Company (Fuyuan) made a timber 
purchase contract with the Xiamen Weige Wood Production Company 
(Weige).  Within the contract, there was a clause providing that “both 
parties should refer to ICC arbitration for dispute resolution relating to 
the performance of the contract.”  Later on, a dispute arose and Fuyuan 
filed a claim at Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court against Weige’s 
breach of contract.  Weige, before submitting its statement of defense, 
alleged jurisdictional objection on the basis that a valid arbitration 
agreement existing between the two parties.
In 1996, the Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court ruled against 
the jurisdictional challenge on two grounds (1) the arbitral institution was 
not specified by the contracting parties, and (2) the parties failed to reach 
a supplementary arbitration agreement clarifying the arbitral body and 
institutional rules.  Therefore, according to Articles 16 and 18 of the AL, 
the arbitral clause was voided.132
The Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court then reported its nega-
tive rulings to the Fujian Higher People’s Court.  In late 1996, the Fujian 
Higher Court133 opined that both the arbitral body and institutional rules 
could be ascertained based on the parties’ intention to arbitrate in the 
ICC Court of Arbitration (1) both parties had agreed to the ICC arbitra-
tion; (2) pursuant to Article 8 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, “when both 
parties submit disputes to arbitration under the ICC, it shall be deemed 
that both parties have selected the ICC Arbitration Rules”;134 (3) under 
Article 1 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, “the only arbitral body attached to 
the ICC is the ICC Court of Arbitration, which is the only institution 
within the ICC that could apply the ICC Arbitration Rules.”135  Therefore, 
the parties shall be deemed to have selected the ICC Court of Arbitration 
as their arbitral body, which complied with the validity requirements un-
der Article 16 of the AL.136
                                                          
132 Nanshen Sun, Jurisdictional Conflict Issues in the Judicial Review of the Foreign-Related Arbi-
tration [Shewai zhongcai sifa shencha zhong de guanxia chongtu wenti], in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
THE FOREIGN-RELATED ARBITRATION, supra note 71.
133 The Fujian Higher People’s Court is the highest judicial authority in the Fujian Province where 
the Xiamen city sits.
134 Int’l Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, art. 6(1), Jan. 1, 1998 [hereinafter ICC Rules].
135 ICC Rules, art.1.
136 SPC Reply to the Fujian Higher People’s Court in Ascertaining the Validity of an Arbitration 
Clause for ICC Arbitration, Zui Gao Fa Fa Jing Han [1996] No. 449.  See Sun, supra note 132, at 
23.
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In this case, the key reason leading to the different enforcement 
results by the two levels of people’s courts137 was the different interpreta-
tive technique adopted by the courts.138  During the judicial review, the 
Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court adopted the textual interpretation 
where the prescription for the ICC itself was not taken as an arbitral in-
stitution, and hence the institutional ambiguity must void the arbitration 
agreement.  However, the Fujian Higher People’s Court interpreted the 
arbitral agreement according to the objective of the contract.139  Given the 
textual uncertainty of the clause, the court looked into the parties’ arbitral 
intention rather than mere text of the arbitration clause in ascertaining the 
identity of the institution.140  Therefore, the word “ICC” was interpreted 
to refer to the parties’ implied selection of the “ICC Court of Arbitration” 
for dispute resolution.141  This judicial approach accords with Article 125 
of the CL, which provides that when there is controversy in understand-
ing contractual clauses, the interpretation shall follow the objective of the 
contract rather than its mere text.142  The Fujian Higher People’s Court 
gave an important indication as to how drafting defects with respect to 
institutional uncertainty should be dealt with in the future.  The court 
found that the “objective-oriented” interpretative technique would show 
more judicial respect to party autonomy.
                                                          
137 Both the factual basis and review criteria remained the same in the first and second trial.  The 
criteria of the judicial review in this case are Articles 16 and 18 of the AL, which prescribes a 
certain arbitral body is a must in validating an arbitration agreement.  See Arbitration Law, arts. 
16, 18 (P.R.C.).
138 Xuemei Cui & Peiyang Xu, On the Expansive Interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement and 
the Implied Arbitration Agreement [Lun zhongcai xieyi de kuoda jieshi—jianyi moshi zhongcai 
xieyi], available at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=187389 (last visited Mar. 10,
2009).  See also the discussions of the “implied terms” in Weixia Gu, Confidentiality Revisited: 
Blessing or Curse in International Commercial Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 613 (2004).
139 See supra Part IV.C.1 in regards to the judicial reasoning of the Weige case.  The details of the 
case are compiled in Sun, supra note 132.
140 Id.
141 Professor Sun also considered that the judicial interpretation of the Fujian Higher People’s Court 
had referred to the international arbitration custom where the selection of the “ICC Court of Ar-
bitration for arbitration” was always abbreviated to “ICC arbitration.”  See Sun supra note 132, 
at 24.
142 According to Article 125 of the CL, “if a dispute arises between the parties concerning the un-
derstanding of a clause of the contract, they shall determine the true intention of that clause by 
making reference to words and sentences used in the contract, the relevant clauses of the con-
tract, objective of the contract, trading practice and the principle of good faith.”  Then, as one 
kind of the contract, the interpretation of the arbitration agreement should follow the same rules 
as applied to the other contractual clauses.  Contract Law, art. 125 (P.R.C.).
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2.  SINGAPORE CASE: IMPORTANCE OF APPLICABLE LAW
In 1998, a Shanghai Corporation (A) signed a sales contract with 
a Singapore Company (B) within which an arbitration clause was agreed 
upon as a mode for dispute resolution.  However, the clause only pro-
vided that arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in Singapore with-
out further specifying the arbitral institution to conduct the arbitration.  
Later, A brought a breach of contract action in the Shanghai Second In-
termediate People’s Court (Second Intermediate Court).  B challenged 
the court’s jurisdiction by relying on the arbitration clause within the 
contract.  A argued that the arbitral clause should be voided because the 
arbitral institution was not articulated.
In June 1999, the Second Intermediate Court of Shanghai ruled 
against the validity on the ground of an unspecific arbitration institution 
in the arbitration agreement by referring to Articles 16 and 18 of the 
AL.143
In August 1999, in receiving the report, the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court (Higher Court) first examined the governing law of the 
arbitration agreement.  Since the parties did not expressly provide for the 
governing law, the Court referred to the applicable law rules under the 
1958 New York Convention under which both China and Singapore are 
member states.  Then pursuant to Article V(1) of the Convention, “absent 
the parties’ choice, the law of the place of arbitration will be deemed as 
the parties’ implied choice of applicable law.”144  Accordingly, the Sin-
gaporean law was adopted to determine the validity.  Because a specific 
arbitral institution was not required under the Singaporean arbitration 
legislation for validity,145 the arbitration agreement was held valid and the 
arbitral jurisdiction was therefore supported.146
In this case, the primary reason that the courts diverged with re-
spect to enforcement is that they applied different legal rules in interpret-
ing the effect of the arbitration agreement.  Although the law governing 
the agreement was not mentioned in the ruling of the Second Interme-
diate Court, the reference to Articles 16 and 18 of the AL indicated that 
                                                          
143 Sun, supra note 132, at 21.
144 New York Convention, art. V(1)(1).
145 Singapore adopted the ML in 1993.  Then, following the ML jurisprudence, the arbitral institu-
tion is only a relevant consideration rather than an essential ingredient in determining the validity 
of the arbitration agreement.
146 The judicial analyses by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court are compiled online.  See China 
Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial Web, http://www.ccmt.org.cn (last visited Mar. 
10, 2009).
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the court applied lex fori (Chinese law) in determining the validity.  The 
approach by the Intermediate Court reflects the often-quoted “judicial 
ignorance of the applicable law rules” in the review of foreign-related 
arbitration agreements among Chinese lower level judiciary before 
2006.147  Hence, the general application of Chinese arbitration legislation 
could easily deny the arbitral jurisdiction for an unclearly specified arbi-
tral institution.  The Higher Court paid more attention to the importance 
of governing law and the Singapore Arbitration Law (lex arbitri) was 
applied.  This approach was consistent with the subsequent SPC Reply to 
the Hubei Higher People’s Court discussed previously.148 In the Singa-
pore case, before the SPC officially announced guidelines with respect to 
applicable legal rules in foreign-related arbitration, the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court had searched for Chinese legislations, including the inter-
national treaties that China had acceded to; i.e., the 1958 New York 
Convention, to save the effect of foreign-related arbitral agreements.149  
As Professor Liu Xiaohong analyzes the case, Shanghai is a leading city 
in the country’s economic development and its judicial attitude towards
arbitration could well influence the parties’ confidence in Chinese com-
mercial dispute resolution environment as a whole.150  To that end, the 
affirmative decision by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court may be seen 
as an example of the provincial effort to support arbitration.151
3.  XIANGYU CASE: INITIAL TEST OF THE SPC DRAFTS
In March 2004, the China Xiamen Xiangyu Corporation (buyer, 
“Xiangyu”) and the Swiss Mechel Trading AG Company (seller, “Me-
chel”) signed a steel sales contract. They agreed that “the conducting of 
contractual rights and obligations shall be referring to ‘CISG 1980’152 and 
‘UNIDROIT PICC 1994.’”153  They further agreed that, “[f]or any dis-
pute arising out of the contract, the parties shall arbitrate in Beijing ac-
                                                          
147 Sun, supra note 132, at 24.
148 Mitsubishi Co. Ltd. (HK) v. Sanxia Inv. Co. Ltd. and Hubei Mech. Eng’g Co. Ltd., Zui Gao Fa Fa 
Jing Han [1999] No.143.
149 See Sun, supra note 132, at 21, regarding the judicial reasoning of the Singapore case.
150 LIU, supra note 36, at 210.
151 See supra Part IV.C.2.
152 U.N. Convention on the Int’l Sale of Goods, G.A. Assembly Resolution 61/33 (July 7, 2006) 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests/cisg.html [hereinafter CISG].
153 UNIDROIT Principles of Int’l Commercial Contracts (adopted 2004 by the Governing Council 
of UNIDROIT), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm [he-
reinafter UNIDTROIT PICC]
GU-FORMATTED 9/7/2009  11:24 AM
254 Wisconsin International Law Journal
cording to the ICC Rules of Arbitration and the language of arbitration in 
either Chinese or English.”  In August 2004, the ICC Court of Arbitra-
tion in Paris accepted the complaint filed by Mechel as the claimant with 
Xiangyu as the respondent.  In September 2004, Xiangyu challenged the 
ICC’s jurisdiction to the Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court for an 
invalid arbitration clause.  Xiangyu alleged that the parties had agreed 
that the arbitration would be held in Beijing, and according to China’s 
arbitration legislation, an arbitration agreement must be void if the arbi-
tral institution is unspecified.
On November 23, 2004, the Xiamen Intermediate Court divided 
the examination of the arbitral clause into two stages.  The first stage re-
lated to the applicable law.  The court considered that, due to the separa-
bility doctrine, both the CISG and PICC should be the laws governing 
substantive rights and obligations of the contract rather than validity of 
the arbitral clause.  Thus, in accordance with the SPC judicial opinion, 
absent the parties’ choice, the law of the agreed place of arbitration (Bei-
jing) shall be applied to govern the validity of the arbitral clause.154  The 
second stage concerns whether the arbitration institution was clearly pro-
vided so as to comply with the validity requirements under the applicable
law (Chinese law).
In the judicial examination, the court first referred to the AL and 
SPC interpretations where an arbitral institution was required to be rea-
sonably ascertainable.155  The court then opined:
[G]iven the parties have adopted the arbitral clause recommended by 
the ICC and given further the ICC Court of Arbitration is the only in-
stitution that could conduct the ICC Arbitration Rules, there is no 
ambiguity in identifying the institution under the SPC interpretative 
jurisprudence and the parties’ intention to arbitrate in ICC Court of 
Arbitration could be ascertained.
In giving the ruling, the court finally quoted the SPC Foreign-Related 
Draft as the authority in supporting the judicial reasoning, Article 26 of 
which provided that the agreement on the institutional arbitration rules 
should be interpreted to mean the parties’ having selected the relevant 
institution to which the rules were attached.156  The Xiamen Court con-
                                                          
154 Mitsubishi Co. Ltd. (HK) v. Sanxia Inv. Co. Ltd. and Hubei Mech. Eng’g Co. Ltd., Zui Gao Fa Fa 
Jing Han [1999] No. 143.
155 See supra Part II.B.1-2.
156 Article 26 of the Foreign-Related Draft provides that “if the parties agreed to some institutional 
rules but failed to agree to arbitration under the institution, the people’s court should support the 
arbitration clause by allowing the institution of which the rules were attached to decide the arbi-
tral case.”  See Foreign-Related Draft, supra note 66, art. 26.
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cluded that, although the Draft had not gone into effect, it reflected the 
latest arbitration jurisprudence and practice of China.  On December 14, 
2004, the Court held that the arbitration clause was valid under the Chi-
nese law and the ICC jurisdiction was confirmed.157
Several important points can be drawn from the Xiangyu case.  
To begin with, in reviewing the arbitration agreement, the Xiamen In-
termediate Court had not only prioritized the rules of applicable law, but 
also clearly understood the doctrine of separability.  The application of 
lex arbitri supported the parties’ intention at the time of making the arbi-
tration agreement.158  Moreover, in ruling on the effect of the arbitral 
clause under Chinese law, the Court, on its own discretion, relied on the 
SPC interpretative jurisprudence in ascertaining the identity of the arbi-
tral institution.  This may reflect that the Court, in respecting parties’ ar-
bitral wishes, was eager to follow the more liberal SPC approach despite 
the risk that the award rendered by foreign arbitration conducted in Chi-
na may not be recognized and enforced finally.159  However, when it 
comes to the final stage of adjudication, it seems that the absence of spe-
cific SPC guidance and a shortage of relevant judicial precedents forced 
the local court to look for support outside the existing judicial interpreta-
tions.  This may explain the reference to SPC Draft Provisions for legal 
authority despite their not having entered into force at the time of juris-
dictional ruling.  Overall, as the initial test of the SPC Foreign-Related 
Draft,160 the Xiangyu case is, undoubtedly, important to an appreciation 
of the increased judicial acceptance by the Chinese lower level people’s 
courts towards arbitration.
                                                          
157 Case Report: Xiamen Interm. People’s Ct. Rejected the Petition to Invalidate the Arbitral Clause 
by the Xiamen Xiangyu Group [Xiamen zhongyuan caiding xiamen xiangyu jituan youxian-
gongsi shenqing hetong zhongcai tiaokuan wuxiao], compiled by the Hangzhou Arb. Comm’n, 
Dec. 14, 2005, available at http://www.hzac.gov.cn/alfx/al8.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
158 Weixia Gu & Joshua Lindenbaum, The NYPE 93 Arbitration Clause: Where Ends the Open-end? 
37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 245, 247, 254 (2006).
159 The top Chinese legislator responsible for arbitration legislation, when asked during the ICCA 
Congress roundtable in Beijing in May 2004 whether ICC and foreign arbitration can be con-
ducted in China, replied no.  See Michael Moser, Commentary on Arbitration and Conciliation 
Concerning China, in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AWARDS, supra note 105, 
at 89.
160 As the judicial clerk in the Fujian Higher People’s Court announced, given that the Xiangyu ju-
risdictional ruling (November 2004) was given just after the SPC Drafts closed its solicitation of 
opinions (August 2004), it was among those initial cases for judicial test.
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4.  CASE SUMMARY
As shown by the three cases above, where the arbitral institution 
is not clearly provided, it is generally observed that the Chinese local 
people’s courts tend to uphold the arbitration agreement by respecting 
the parties’ arbitral wishes.  The supportive judicial approach is mirrored 
through the courts’ flexible interpretative technique (Weige and Xiangyu) 
and their attention to the rules of applicable law (Singapore and Xian-
gyu). The pro-arbitration approach has been most obviously reflected in 
the Xiangyu case where the Xiamen Intermediate Court liberally exer-
cised its discretion to refer to the yet-to-be-promulgated SPC Draft Pro-
visions.
In both Weige and Singapore, the different rulings in these two 
cases reflect the difficulties with enforcement at the lower and interme-
diate levels of the judiciary.  In China, generally, provincial higher 
people’s courts are equipped with more experienced judges who are bet-
ter able to draw on the principles from the national legislation and judi-
cial interpretations in an effort to address the lack of sufficient applicable 
legal rules. In enforcing defective arbitration agreements regarding “am-
biguous arbitration commission,” because the prima facie wording of the 
agreement could satisfy the examination, the judicial check may not need 
to extend to case substance and there are fewer concerns about local pro-
tectionism.161  As such, the rejection by the intermediate courts in Weige
and Singapore might mostly be due to the lack of knowledge about arbi-
tration by local judges.162  Under the pre-reporting system, the higher-
level judiciary could have a chance to redress the flawed adjudications of 
the lower level.  But, whether the redress actually takes place may large-
ly rely upon the judicial quality of the higher-level court.
In Weige and Singapore, both the Fujian and Shanghai Higher 
People’s Courts understood and correctly applied the pro-arbitration ap-
proach of the SPC guidelines, so that the parties’ arbitral wishes were 
confirmed at the provincial level rather than having to be dealt with at 
the SPC.  Given that the timelines for the “report” and “reply” under the 
“pre-reporting” system are unclear from the SPC Notices, the more 
                                                          
161 In determining the validity of the arbitration agreement in cases of “non-signatory third party,” 
however, the judicial check may need to extend to the case substance to verify the change of the 
arbitral party.  The substantial review could involve the knowledge of the financial standing of 
the relevant company such that the local protectionism concerns might arise.  See discussions su-
pra in Section A.3 of this chapter.
162 See discussions infra in Sections B.1 and B.2 of this chapter.
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courts involved could mean the more time costs in realizing the parties’ 
arbitral interest.163 In addition, Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court re-
flects the increasing judicial deference to the principle of party autonomy
with the passage of time.
Finally, it may still be doubtful whether the then soliciting SPC 
Draft Provisions could be justified as legal authority in the judicial rul-
ing.  As the Xiangyu case indicates, though the intermediate court was 
eager to affirm the parties’ intention to arbitrate, the SPC jurisprudence 
may not be clear enough to make the judges reach that decision. Luck-
ily, the situation has now been remedied by Article 4 of the most recently 
promulgated SPC Interpretation.164  The reasoning report by the Xiamen 
Intermediate Court, however, to some extent, reflects the local judicial 
reluctance in exercising the pro-arbitration discretion absent SPC’s spe-
cific guidelines.
C.  ANALYSIS OF ENFORCEMENT DIVERGENCES AND DIFFICULTIES
The enforcement reports above reflect the inadequate Chinese 
judicial system in the area of arbitration.  The local people’s courts lack 
judicial independence and integrity, and do not have the knowledge or 
experience to handle arbitration cases.
1.  LACK OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY
The striking ruling in the Baotou case indicates that some local 
people’s courts tend to intervene into arbitration where local businesses 
are involved, particularly where the business affects the local economy.165  
Local protectionism is intertwined with a general lack of independence 
of the court system.  In China, judicial intervention in arbitration actually 
comes from local political and administrative pressures.  Professor Ran-
dall Peerenboom has explained the issue of judicial independence by 
creating two categories, collective independence of the judiciary as a 
whole and independent decision-making by individual judges.166  The 
collective independence requires the courts to be adequately funded so 
that they function free from governmental influences; while independent 
                                                          
163 Weixia Gu & Robert Morgan, Improving Commercial Dispute Resolution in China, ASIAN 
DISPUTE REV., Apr. 2005, at 8-9.
164 See SPC Interpretation, supra note 62, art. 4 (second paragraph).
165 For discussions on the Baotou case, see supra Part IV.A.3 of this article.
166 RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARDS RULE OF LAW 288-90 (2002).
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decision-making requires the judges’ terms of office to be secured and 
their appointment depolicized so that judges can perform impartially.167
In China, the PRC Constitution and Organic Law of the People’s 
Courts provides that Chinese courts have the right to be free from exter-
nal interferences in their work.168 However, the laws further require that 
individual courts at different levels must be administratively and institu-
tionally accountable to the corresponding level of the people’s con-
gresses.169  In addition, courts in China are subject to dual leadership.170  
They receive political supervision from the Party Committee (dangwei) 
within the court, and the Party Political and Legal Affairs Committee 
(zhengfawei) outside the court.  At the same time, their decisions and 
court judgments are scrutinized professionally by higher-level people’s 
courts on the basis of judiciary hierarchy.  This stands in sharp contrast 
with the understanding of collective independence in the Western ideol-
ogies where all individual courts enjoy functional independence.  As 
such, based on Professor Peerenboom’s observation, the Chinese courts 
as a whole appear to enjoy institutional independence, although individu-
al courts do not.171
The independence of local people’s courts is further undermined 
by the way in which they are funded.  Courts in China are financed by 
governments at their corresponding levels.172  Therefore, local courts are 
subsidized by the relevant local people’s governments.  It is unfortunate 
that while the SPC supervises the adjudicative work of all lower level 
people’s courts, it has no power over their budgets.173  Local judiciaries 
are thus dependent on local governments for even basic necessities such 
as salaries and housing allowances.  However, since local governments 
need to support themselves and local courts through local taxes, fees, and 
charges collected from local businesses, an incentive for the court to lean 
on local businesses has formed.174  A locally subsidized court may be 
subject to accusation if the ruling hampers the local economic interests 
and the court itself might be financially disadvantaged.  Particularly, 
                                                          
167 Id.
168 XIAN FA art. 126 (2004) (P.R.C.); Organic Law of the People’s Courts, art. 4 (P.R.C.).
169 XIAN FA art. 128 (2004) (P.R.C.).
170 ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ch. 7 (2004).
171 PEERENBOOM, supra note 166, at 298.
172 Id. at 311.
173 XIAN FA art. 127 (2004) (P.R.C.)
174 See Laifan Lin, Judicial Independence in Japan: A Re-Investigation for China, 13 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 185, 197-201 (1999).
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where the state-owned enterprise (SOE, guoyouqiye) or government-
supported business (GSB, zhengfufuchichanye) is at issue, and where the 
arbitration agreement provides for arbitration outside the locality,175 the 
local court is more likely to seize its jurisdiction and refuse to refer par-
ties to arbitration outside the local jurisdiction.176 Moreover, since Chi-
nese local governments have a political responsibility to maintain the so-
cial stability in the locality, they might interfere in the judicial ruling if 
the enforcement could hamper a major local business.  From the perspec-
tive of government authorities, strict implementation of independent 
courts and judges may lead to the loss of control on the final outcome of 
commercial dispute resolution and thus exert an adverse impact on the 
SOE and GSB as a political, economic, and social safety net in China.  
Thus, the possible cash flow problems of the GSB would trigger the ex-
ercise of judicial umbrella as the Baotou case above illustrates. Some 
commentators, however, argue that, in such cases, both the court order-
ing enforcement and the SOE receiving the order are governmental or-
gans. Therefore, local protectionism must be prevalent unless the court 
can relieve itself from the budget constraints.177
The courts’ financial reliance on the local government has al-
lowed local political and administrative powers to encourage local pro-
tectionism. It has further led to the unbalanced development of local 
people’s courts across the country.  Dean Chenguang Wang of the 
Tsinghua University Law School notes that the court system in coastal 
areas are better developed than their hinterland counterparts as the econ-
omy in coastal areas has been better off and administrations more libera-
lized.178  By contrast, rural areas often suffer a budget constraint due to 
the under-developed economy.  As a result, the court system there may 
suffer more administrative interferences.  This helps to explain the dif-
ference of judicial attitudes taken by the Baotou and Xiamen Interme-
diate Courts albeit the former is a more recent case.179
                                                          
175 If it is a local arbitration agreement pointing to dispute resolution under the local arbitration 
commission, then there is already leverage for exercise of local government control given the 
administrative infrastructure of these commissions.
176 In China, SOEs are thought to promote economic development and maintain social stability in 
that they produce jobs and provide various forms of social welfare to their workers, retirees, and 
their family members.
177 See Yuan, supra note 129.
178 Ellen Reinstein, Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign Investors: The Enforcement of Arbitration 
Awards in the People’s Republic of China, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 37, 54 (2005).
179 The Baotou Intermediate Court adjudicated the case in 2006, where the Xiamen Intermediate 
Court adjudicated the Xiangyu case two years earlier in 2004.
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With respect to independent decision-making, in the Western 
ideology, judicial independence includes independent decision-making
by individual judges. However, it is a different story in China.180 In the 
Chinese context, individual judges, by and large, do not have the right to 
decide cases on their own.  Judges at all levels of people’s courts are di-
vided into different administrative ranks; i.e., the President of the Court 
(yuanzhang), Vice President (fuyuanzhang), and Division Heads of the 
Chambers (tingzhang).181 The people’s congresses at different levels de-
cide on the appointment of the court presidents and the presidents then 
decide on the appointment of the vice presidents and division heads.182
Most cases are heard by a collegiate panel of three judges and the presi-
dents or division heads will determine which judge will act as the chair 
of the panel, and they may further review the panel’s decisions if they 
think necessary.183 In turn, collegiate panels are often required under the 
court’s internal rules to obtain the approval of the division heads, vice 
presidents, presidents, and the court’s Adjudicative Committee (shen-
panweiyuanhui)184 before they render their judgments.  Thus, the admin-
istrative rank of the judge is important in determining the final outcome 
of the case.  The decision-making of individual judges is controlled indi-
rectly through these administrative means.185
Outside the court, local governments and the Chinese Commun-
ist Party (CCP) Committee (dangwei) may further influence judicial de-
cisions of significant cases, and on the appointment, promotion, and re-
moval of local judges.186 Judges rely on salaries and housing benefits 
                                                          
180 PEERENBOOM, supra note 166, at 286.
181 Organic Law of the People’s Court, arts. 19, 24, 27, 31 (P.R.C.)
182 Id.
183 Organic Law of the People’s Court, art. 10 (P.R.C.)
184 The Adjudicative Committee is the highest adjudicative body inside the court, the establishment 
of which functions to guide the handling of difficult cases received by the court. The committee 
is composed of the Party Secretary, President, Vice-Presidents, and Division Heads of the court 
concerned. See Organic Law of the People’s Court, art. 11 (P.R.C.)
185 Dean Liming Wang of the People’s University is one of the many scholars who have called for 
an end to the system of administrative ranking of judges.
186 The CCP Committee exerts tremendous influence at all levels of the court system.  According to 
Article 101 of the PRC Constitution, it should be the local people’s congress that appoints chief 
judges of the provincial court and the chief judge nominate the other lower level of judges.  
However, in reality, the local CCP Committee often selects judges, and the people’s congress ra-
tifies its choices.  These judges serve on the Adjudication Committee [shenpan weiyuanhui] of 
each court, wielding considerable power in determining the outcome of controversial cases.  
Most of the judges are also CCP members the leader of which discuss cases involving difficult 
legal issues with the Political-Legal Committee [zhengfa weiyuanhui] and accept general policies 
set by the CCP.  XIAN FA art. 101 (2004) (P.R.C).
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provided by the municipal government. Moreover, when appointing and 
promoting judges, the local political and administrative regime evaluates 
them in terms of obedience to its policy.187 Hence, local judges may have 
to intervene in the case in order to render a favorable judgment when the 
local business is at stake.  This is required in order to safeguard the local 
financial needs of the court and to allow the judge to continue to be pro-
moted.  As Professor Stanley Lubman comments, this personal depen-
dence has resulted from the institutional dependence of the individual lo-
cal people’s courts, the combination of which has subjected the Chinese 
local judiciary to local politics and administration.188  Judicial interven-
tions in arbitral enforcement follow as a natural result.  In this regard, the 
unpredictability in enforcing arbitration agreements corresponds to the 
past notorious records of the enforcement of arbitral awards by the Chi-
nese local judiciaries.189  In extreme cases, judges could help local com-
panies with fraudulent transfers of assets as a way of evading enforce-
ment.190
The SPC has become aware of the issue and has openly criti-
cized the detrimental practices of local protectionism in the Chinese so-
cial legal system.191 There have been some improvements in the general 
                                                          
187 Yuwen Li, Court Reformation in China: Problems, Progress and Prospects, in
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 55, 58-9 (Jianfu Chen et al. 
eds., 2002).  See also Robb LaKritz, Taming a 5,000 Year-old Dragon: Toward a Theory of Le-
gal Development in Post-Mao China, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 237, 260, 262 (1997).
188 STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 252, 279 (1999).
189 According to Cheng, Moser, and Wang, intermediate people’s courts where respondent was do-
miciled or their property was located had repeatedly refused to enforce a number of arbitral 
awards because the enforcement might have impaired the local interests to which the courts at-
tached significance.  See DEJUN CHENG, MICHAEL MOSER & SHENGCHANG WANG,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: COMMENTARY, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 76 (1995).
190 In the Revpower case, the Chinese company appeared to be insolvent under the arrangement of 
the local people’s court so that the enforcement was delayed. See Fredrick Brown & Catherine 
Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the 
People’s Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 329, 341-2 (1997).
191 Jianxin Ren, then Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s Court, proposed at the National Confe-
rence on Politics and Law in December 1992 “five prohibitions” for the removal of local protec-
tionism.  Those proposals were that (1) local CPC cadres should be prohibited from interfering 
with the judicial process; (2) governmental officials should be prohibited from making threats 
against judges carrying out the enforcement of court orders; (3) judicial organs should be prohi-
bited from making unfair rulings in favor of local parties; (4) officials of the public security and 
procuratorial organization should be prohibited from interfering with the adjudication of com-
mercial cases; and (5) any organ or individual should be prohibited from hindering enforcement 
of orders of courts.  See Chief Justice Jianxin Ren, “Five Prohibitions” Proposal, Nat’l Conf. on 
Pol. & Law, Dec. 1992, available at http://bjds.bjdj.gov.cn/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=7596
(last visited June 8, 2009). The “five prohibitions” are listed in the eighth paragraph.
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enforcement records, including those taking place in the area of arbitra-
tion.192 However, remarkable improvements have not been seen if we 
separate the judicial enforcement records by localities.  The problem here 
lies in the fact that China is a highly-centralized system where the SPC 
supervises its lower level courts, yet local judicial powers may deviate 
from their central controllers in pursuing local economic interests.  One 
author explains that local government needs to supply its own social wel-
fare, to promote industries in its locality, and to finance itself in order to 
implement its plans.193  According to the observation by Professor Pitman 
Potter, Chinese courts could be more dependent upon the local govern-
ment due to a gradual administrative decentralization that will be taking 
place alongside China’s WTO membership.194 The decentralization in 
the course of pursuing economic reforms may then fuel the local judicial
efforts to develop their own practices in implementing the national rules
according to their own needs.  Thus, even though local judges might un-
derstand the SPC’s pro-arbitration approach correctly, they may not be 
able to implement it when a local interest must be protected.
2.  LACK OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE ON ARBITRATION
With respect to the judicial quality in handling arbitration cases, 
as reflected by a line of cases discussed previously (Longhai, Huaxiang, 
Baotou, Weige, and Singapore), there is an apparent lack of proper un-
derstanding and experience regarding standard arbitration norms and 
practices among local Chinese judges.
In the early 1980s, approximately two-thirds of the Chinese 
judges did not have a law degree, and one-third were demobilized mili-
tary personnel.195  This has changed to a large extent in the early twenty-
first century. Now, new judges are required to pass the National Judicial 
Exam.196 Existing judges without a law degree will be trained under the 
                                                          
192 See discussions infra in Section V.A of this article.
193 Taroh Inoue, Introduction to International Commercial Arbitration in China, 36 HONG KONG L.J.
171 (2006).
194 Pitman Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture and Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 465, 473 (2004).
195 See LUBMAN, supra note 188, at 253.  In the reconstruction of the court system that commenced 
immediately after the Cultural Revolution, demobilized soldiers became judges, since they were 
considered good candidates owing to their propensity to promote proletarian ideologies.  Thus, 
many of their decisions were based not on law but on communist ideologies.  See Li, supra note 
187, at 59, 63.
196 Judges Law, art. 12 (P.R.C.).
GU-FORMATTED 9/7/2009  11:24 AM
Vol. 27, No. 2        Judicial Review Over Arbitration in China 263
central or local judges’ colleges.197  However, education for judges on 
commercial law practices is still insufficient.  They have limited know-
ledge of modern standards of arbitration, let alone the generally prac-
ticed, pro-validity approach in determining the effect of arbitration 
agreements.  Accordingly, local judges sometimes mistakenly apply the 
doctrine of separability, demonstrated in the Longhai and Huaxiang cas-
es. In addition, local judges also ignore the applicable legal rules when 
determining the validity of foreign-related arbitration agreements, as 
seen in the Singapore case.  This general shortage of judicial expertise on 
arbitration has also caused some arbitral awards to be unduly set aside or 
not enforced.
The lack of a tenure system and of decent salaries (as compared 
to lawyers) has also exacerbated the shortage of skilled commercial 
judges. Some judges have committed corruption, while others have 
abandoned their posts for the more lucrative practice in large law 
firms.198  The qualifications of local judges are also economic-driven.199
Economically well developed areas attract better judges with the skills to 
deal with foreign cases and international arbitration norms.  Therefore, 
judges in coastal areas (such as Shanghai, Xiamen) are more competent 
and they take a more liberal approach towards arbitration agreements.200
Rural areas (such as Baotou) are ill prepared to handle arbitration cas-
es.201  The unbalanced qualification of judges also brings about the uncer-
tainty of judicial attitude and approach towards arbitration in different 
areas of China.  This is also the reason why when Hong Kong signed a 
mutual agreement with the mainland in 2000 with respect to recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards, Hong Kong was reluctant to subject 
its arbitral awards to review by people’s courts in all Chinese places.  
Some of the intermediate courts in the mainland have never taken up any 
Hong Kong or foreign-related cases, nor do they have qualified judicial 
personnel to deal with such cases.202
                                                          
197 Report by Xiao Yang, President of the Sup. People’s Ct., at the 4th Session of the 9th National 
People’s Congress in Beijing, Mar. 10, 2001.
198 One SPC judge commented that in 1998-1999 alone, approximately 15 percent of all people’s 
court judges left their position for a position in a law firm.  See Reinstein, supra note 178, at 60, 
71.
199 Lecture with Dean Chenguang Wang, N.Y.U Law School, Lecture on Resolving Business Dis-
putes in China (Mar. 18, 2007).
200 See supra Part IV.C.1-3 for case analyses of Weige, Singapore and Xiangyu of the Xiamen and 
Shanghai People’s Courts.
201 See supra Part IV.A.3 for case analyses of Baotou court in Baotou.
202 Xian Chu Xhang, The Agreement Between Mainland China and the Hong Kong SAR on Mutual 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Problems and Prospects, 29 HONG KONG L.J. 463 (1999).
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In addition, there are perceptions that the rapid development of 
arbitration may decrease courts’ caseloads.  This has fostered judicial 
hostility towards arbitration. Such judicial hostility tends to make local 
people’s courts compete for cases with local arbitration commissions in 
that local judges use their review power to turn down arbitration agree-
ments in order to “win” the jurisdiction.203
All of these factors could affect the quality of judicial review 
over arbitration. Eventually, excessive judicial intervention resulting 
from the misunderstanding of local judges will undermine the quality of 
enforcement of arbitration (both agreements and awards).204
D.  CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS
It is important to note that under the Chinese judicial review sys-
tem over arbitration, a couple of defects are evident.  First, most local 
people’s courts suffer institutional deficiency both in terms of finance 
and function.  Hence, within the current Chinese context where local pro-
tectionism and corruption are still pervasive, the local court may not be 
able to refrain from local party and governmental pressures which se-
riously influence their decision making in the area of enforcement. 
Second, local judges are not equipped to deal with arbitration cases.  This 
has led to some arbitration agreements and awards to be unfairly denied.  
Under the circumstances, parties may find it hard to proceed to arbitra-
tion at the lower level judiciary.
Although the SPC has been working hard to pay more judicial 
respect to parties’ autonomy and interest in arbitration by issuing a long 
list of liberal guidelines, the efforts are found to have been mitigated 
downstream, thereby negating any advantages gained by the SPC’s pro-
validity initiatives.  Accordingly, although the SPC is pro-arbitration, 
lower level people’s courts may not be.  Their institutional incapacity 
(including incapacity of the judicial personnel) has thus subjected the en-
forcement ruling, i.e. outcome of arbitration, to political and administra-
tive hands.  As stated previously, arbitration has been one of the areas 
reflecting the general enforcement problems faced with the Chinese 
courts. In particular, it reflects the uncertainty of enforcement by the 
Chinese local level courts.  In light of such uncertainty, foreign investors, 
                                                          
203 Gu, supra note 130, at 497.
204 Jianhua Zhong & Guanghua Yu, Establishing the Truth on Facts: Has the Chinese Civil Process 
Achieved This Goal, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L. L. & POL’Y. 393, 429-433 (2003).
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suspicious about the biased local judges, and in order to avoid the unpre-
dictable and sometimes corrupted Chinese court system, often add an ar-
bitration clause outlining a strategy for pursuing a more impartial out-
come of commercial disputes.  However, given that both arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards must undergo review by the Chinese 
courts for enforcement, foreign parties may yet find themselves forced 
into the situation they tried to avoid.
Domestic parties may even worry about their autonomy and in-
terest in arbitration being denied without the procedural remedy such as 
the “pre-reporting” system available to their foreign-related counterparts. 
The “pre-reporting” system applies to foreign-related arbitration agree-
ments and arbitral awards as a way for higher people’s courts to counte-
ract local protectionism and local judicial malpractices. Local protec-
tionism, however, attacks not only foreign parties but domestic parties 
from outside the region as well.  Therefore, it remains uncertain how to 
protect the lawful arbitral interests of large numbers of domestic “alien” 
parties. The dual-track system and the foreign party favored treatment 
have been warmly welcomed by foreign investors as centralized review 
will prompt better enforcement results.205 Nevertheless, it may not be 
welcomed by domestic investors and this practice has been criticized for 
having overlooked domestic interests. Moreover, the higher level judi-
ciary’s interference into jurisdictional rulings of lower level courts has 
been challenged as a violation of due process and the independence of 
judicial decision-making.206  Serious measures are thus urgently needed 
to officially address the inadequate lower level court system in China and 
to significantly improve their quality in handling arbitration cases.
IV. FURTHER JUDICIAL EFFORTS AND THEIR 
RESTRICTIONS
There have been wide international concerns by academics and 
practitioners about the enforcement problems of Chinese arbitration.207  
                                                          
205 Hu Li, Setting Aside an Arbitral Award in the People’s Republic of China, 12 AM. REV. INT’L.
ARB. 36-7 (2001).
206 Dan Ye, On the Reasonability of the Judicial Power in Arbitration from the Perspective of Mod-
ern Judicial Ideologies, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FOREIGN-RELATED ARBITRATION, supra
note 132, at 98.
207 See, e.g., Li, supra note 205; Gu, supra note 130; Reinstein, supra note 178; Inoue, supra note 
193.
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To address the situation, the SPC has introduced a series of measures to 
enhance the infrastructure of the judiciary.  Furthermore, there have been 
efforts at the provincial level to pay equally close attention to judicial re-
view over arbitration on both tracks.
A.  SPC EFFORTS IN ENHANCING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE
JUDICIARY
In the past decade, the SPC has initiated reforms and measures to 
improve the judicial infrastructure.  One of the key reforms is the Five-
Year Reform Plan of the People’s Court (1999-2003) (First Five-Year 
Reform Plan)208 which focuses on promoting the quality of judges 
through a more depoliticized judge selection system.209 Subsequent to 
that, in October 2004, the SPC promulgated the Outline of the Second-
Five-Year Reform Plan of the People’s Court (2004-2008) (Second Five-
Year Reform Outline).210
The Second Five-Year Reform Outline appears particularly bold 
in setting out no fewer than fifty objectives for upgrading the Chinese 
court system.  As a whole, the provisions demonstrate a cautious aware-
ness of the importance of greater professionalism, independence and in-
tegrity of the judiciary, reducing local protectionism, and stamping out 
corruption, while acknowledging the leadership by the Party and supervi-
sion by people’s congresses at each level.211  On collective independence, 
the SPC seeks to enhance the autonomy of the local people’s courts, and 
begins to explore the establishment of a guaranteed financing for local 
courts by inserting provisions in central and provincial government
budgets.212  Perhaps the program’s boldest proposal is loosening the grip 
                                                          
208 Five-Year People’s Courts Reform Plan [Renmin fayuan wunian gaige gangyao 1999-2003], in 
GAZETTE OF THE SPC [ZHONGHUARENMINGONGHEGUO ZUIGAORENMINFAYUAN GONGGAO]
1999 No. 6, 182-90, available at http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/gj/22/14526.html (last visited June 
8, 2009).
209 In the next five years, all the people’s courts must adopt a selection system which requires that 
the higher court judges be selected from the most-qualified judges of lower courts, or high-
performance lawyers, or other high-level legal professionals.  Judges who are newly recruited 
from the recruitment examination should first work for the intermediate people’s courts and ba-
sic people’s courts.
210 Outline of the Second Five-Year People’s Court Reform Plan [Renmin fayuan di’erge wunian 
gaige gangyao 2004-2008], available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=120832 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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of local power holders over local courts.  The SPC calls for “within a 
certain geographic area, the implementation of a system of uniform re-
cruitment and uniform assignment of local judges in basic and interme-
diate courts by the upper level people’s courts.”213
Further, under the First Five-Year Reform Plan, the judicial per-
sonnel must pass the National Judicial Examinations to get qualified.  
Under the more recent Outline, judges now need to participate in annual 
judicial training to keep up-to-date on legal rules so that they can better 
deal with cases.214 Some other legal education opportunities in the area 
of international commercial practice have also begun in China in an at-
tempt to respond to the country’s accession to the WTO.  For example, 
since 1999, more than 240 provincial and intermediate-court-level judges 
have graduated from the Tsinghua-Temple International Business Law 
LLM program sponsored by the SPC in which an intensive course on 
“international commercial arbitration” is involved.215  Local judges from 
the coastal area courts may have more chances to study abroad due to the
more developed economy and liberal administration.216 This supports the 
findings of pro-validity enforcement in the Singapore and Xiangyu cases 
by the Shanghai and Xiamen Intermediate Courts discussed previously.217
These measures are seen as important steps to improve understanding of 
modern commercial laws and arbitration norms among the Chinese 
judges.
B.  LOCAL JUDICIAL EFFORTS IN MERGING THE DUAL TRACKS
Before the official promulgation of the SPC Interpretation, many 
academics proposed that “pre-reporting” be clearly written into the Inter-
pretation to keep with the more relaxed judicial supervision over the for-
eign regime.218 The Beijing Higher People’s Court, however, argued that 
                                                          
213 Id. art. 37.
214 The SPC has trained the LHPC judges at the National Judge Institute, and those judges are re-
sponsible for training other judges.  Outline of the Second-Five-Year People’s Court Reform 
Plan, art. 39 (P.R.C.).
215 Conversation with Huang Ying, Shanghai Higher People’s Court judge, who participated in the 
Tsinghua-Temple LL.M. program in 2001.
216 For example, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court provides a western legal training pro-
gram for its judges.  Each year since 1998, approximately fifteen judges have been sent to the 
University of Hong Kong Law Faculty to study the Master of Common Law (MCL) program.
217 Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
97, 122-32 (2005).
218 See a series of academic essays commenting on the lack of incorporating “pre-reporting” system 
in the SPC Interpretation by Shengchang Wang, Xiaolong Lu, Chengxin Zhou, Jinqian Zhang 
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the protection shall be applied equally to both sides. As such, an “internal 
pre-reporting” scheme has been established within the Beijing people’s 
courts.219
Pursuant to the scheme, where the first instance court attempts to 
turn down the jurisdiction in domestic arbitration, it must report directly 
to the Beijing Higher People’s Court.  Lower level courts in Beijing can-
not deny the effect of either domestic arbitral agreements or awards until 
they get it affirmed by the highest court in the Municipality.220 Having 
done so, the gap in “pre-reporting” with respect to the previously over-
looked domestic arbitral regime can now be closed in Beijing. As Judge 
Tian Yuxi, Head of Enforcement Division of the Beijing Higher People’s 
Court, introduces it, “[t]he creation of the ‘internal pre-reporting’ system 
shows the determination of the Beijing judiciary to provide a pro-
arbitration environment for investment both at home and abroad.”221
Beyond that, it may represent local judicial efforts to merge the two 
tracks where other provincial courts may follow the footsteps. Perhaps, 
rather than applying the “pre-reporting” to both the foreign and domestic 
regimes, the system could be abolished altogether because “pre-
reporting” is an inefficient use of judicial resources.  In addition, it influ-
ences the independent judicial thinking of lower level judges.222
C.  CONCLUSION: RESTRICTIONS UNDER STATE CONTROL
The enforcement study reveals that there has been distorted state 
control over the judiciary in China, which has indirectly controlled the 
outcome of arbitration such as enforcement of both arbitral agreements 
and awards.  Born of the dependent status of local people’s courts on lo-
cal governments for survival and development, they are seriously pres-
sured by local political and administrative powers in their decision-
making process.  It is also observed that the Chinese local courts are not 
sufficiently equipped both infra-structurally and professionally to keep 
up with the pro-validity and pro-enforcement arbitration reforms initiated 
by the SPC.  Thus, lack of cooperation by the local judiciary is a frequent 
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219 Speech of Tian Yuxi, Head of Enforcement Division of the Beijing Higher People’s Court, at the 
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occurrence in the enforcement of arbitration agreements, thereby possi-
bly negating any advantages gained by the SPC’s pro-arbitration initia-
tives. As such, the sooner the local people’s courts can realize their insti-
tutional independence and improve their quality, the faster China’s 
enforcement records can develop.
To address the enforcement difficulties pervasive among the 
lower level judiciary (especially in the hinterland), the SPC has intro-
duced quite a few directives aimed at the independence and integrity of 
the judiciary including the most recent Second Five-Year Reform Out-
line.  It has also attempted to provide education opportunities on arbitra-
tion norms for lower-level judges.  The improved independence and edu-
cation is expected to bring along increased judicial respect to parties’ 
autonomy in arbitration.  Although an optimistic view has been taken 
towards the implementation of this ambitious Second Five-Year Outline, 
so far, neither the practice of “guaranteed financing” nor “uniform re-
cruitment” of lower level judges has been reported in other places in 
China. As such, the extent to which these reforms will actually be im-
plemented are yet to be seen.  Based on the observation by Professor Je-
rome Cohen, the political status quo in China does not allow rapid ex-
pansion of its judicial power as the Party government may not wish to 
make quick changes, especially those that might threaten the primacy of 
the administrative power.223 This, seen from another perspective, ex-
plains the checkered development of the Chinese judiciary, which is 
largely subject to state control, such as the country’s political and admin-
istrative encroachment.  Therefore, more breakthrough changes need to 
take place to empower the courts and individual judges in decision-
making of the cases. The success of the reforms will always be tested on 
the basis of the degree to which they are implemented in practice.
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